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TRADE SECRET FAIR USE
Deepa Varadarajan*
Trade secret law arose to help companies protect confidential
information (e.g., the Coca-Cola formula) from competitors seeking to copy
their innovative efforts. But companies increasingly use trade secret law to
block a wide swath of information from the scrutinizing eyes of consumers,
public watchdog groups, and potential improvers. Companies can do this,
in part, because trade secret law lacks clear limiting doctrines that
consider the social benefits of unauthorized use. For example, trade secret
law makes no allowance for the departing employee that uses proprietary
information to create a substantially improved product or disclose public
health risks.
This Article argues that trade secret law’s indifference to the social
benefits of unauthorized use stands in contrast to other intellectual property
doctrines, like patent and copyright. Copyright law incorporates the
affirmative defense of “fair use,” which aims to protect a variety of
unauthorized but socially beneficial uses of another’s copyrighted work
(e.g., educational uses). To a lesser extent, patent law’s reverse doctrine of
equivalents and remedies analysis direct courts to consider the social
benefits of a defendant’s technological improvement. Such limiting
doctrines act as safety valves to reconcile intellectual property rights with
competing cumulative innovation and First Amendment interests. This
Article demonstrates the merits of a similar safety valve in trade secret law
and argues that courts should adopt a multi-factor “trade secret fair use”
analysis to better address these competing concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
Not all unauthorized users of property are considered villains by the law.
Take, for example, the trespasser who invades an owner’s parcel of land to
take shelter from a natural disaster or the mistaken improver who takes
lumber from another’s land to make far more valuable wooden hoops.
Property law sanctions such unauthorized uses, either by excusing the
user’s liability or removing injunctive relief as a remedy.1
Moving from the realm of tangible property to intellectual property, the
law is similarly forgiving of the teacher who makes limited but
unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work for classroom use; or the
parodist who incorporates lyrics from a copyrighted song into a new song
for humorous effect; or the follow-on inventor who makes significant
improvements to a patented train brake that nonetheless infringes the
original owner’s patent.2 In these latter examples, the violation of
copyright or patent laws carries certain social benefits that are recognized
and encouraged through various limiting doctrines. Notably, copyright law
and, to a lesser extent, patent law incorporate ex post limiting doctrines that
try to balance owners’ rights to exclude against competing concerns, like
promoting cumulative innovation (i.e., new works that build on existing
works) and First Amendment interests.3
Trade secret law is a different kind of animal. Like patent and copyright,
trade secret law protects intangible, informational goods. Specifically, trade
secret law protects certain confidential information that companies attempt
to keep secret, including both “technical” information (e.g., mechanical
processes and chemical formulas) and “business” information (e.g.,
customer lists, marketing plans, and pricing data). The subject matter of
trade secret overlaps with patent and copyright but can sweep even more
broadly. For “virtually any useful information” can be a trade secret, so
long as the information is relatively secret, economically valuable, and
subjected to reasonable secrecy precautions by the owner.4 Trade secret

1. See, e.g., Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 320 (1871) (applying the doctrine of
accession to hold that Wetherbee could keep the hoops made from lumber taken in good
faith, provided he compensated Green for the value of lumber); Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188,
189 (Vt. 1908) (holding that “necessity . . . will justify entries upon land and interferences
with personal property that would otherwise have been trespasses”).
2. See infra Part II.A–B.
3. See infra Part II.A–B.
4. See JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 1.01, at 1-6 (2014).
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law’s reach has become even more expansive in recent decades, creeping
further into places that patent and copyright cannot.5
To be liable for trade secret misappropriation, however, one must
“misappropriate” the protected information. That is, the acquisition, use, or
disclosure of the information must involve “improper means” or breach of a
confidentiality duty.6 This requirement makes trade secret law unique and
reflects how its origins differ from those of patent and copyright laws.
Despite such differences, however, courts and scholars increasingly view
trade secret law as a subset of intellectual property, because like patent and
copyright laws, trade secret law can also serve as a mechanism to encourage
invention and creation.7
And like transgressors in patent and copyright, those who violate trade
secret law sometimes serve socially beneficial ends. For example, consider
an employee who publicly discloses without permission the secret formula
for a coal processing chemical or a hydraulic “fracking” chemical that can
leak into the water supply and significantly affect public health. Or
consider a health care consulting company that aggregates and discloses
prices paid by hospitals for medical devices, information that is deemed
proprietary by the device manufacturer but has implications for national
health care costs.8 Or consider a departing employee who makes significant
improvements to trade secret–protected information gleaned from her
previous workplace, resulting in a train brake with vastly superior stopping
power.9 All of these potential violations of trade secret law carry societal
benefits that ought to be encouraged, or at least, not discouraged. But trade
secret law is largely indifferent to the benefits of unauthorized use.
Unlike copyright and patent laws, trade secret law lacks limiting
doctrines sufficiently attuned to a defendant’s follow-on improvements10 or
to First Amendment interests, like creating a well-informed citizenry and
fostering open debate over matters of public interest. While trade secret
law excuses “reverse engineers” (i.e., those who take something apart to see
how it works) from liability,11 in a number of contexts this defense falls
5. See, e.g., David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our
Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 151–55 (2007); see also Annemarie Bridy, Trade
Secret Prices and High-Tech Devices: How Medical Device Manufacturers Are Seeking to
Sustain Profits by Propertizing Prices, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187, 188 (2009); infra Part
I.A.
6. See infra Part II.C.
7. See infra Part I.B.3.
8. See infra Part III.B.
9. See infra Part III.A.
10. In previous work, I have argued that even limiting doctrines in patent and copyright
law should focus more directly on the fact and significance of a second-comer’s
unauthorized “improvement.” Drawing comparisons to “improvement doctrines” in tangible
property law, I suggest reforms to patent and copyright law that would make consideration
of a defendant’s improvement more explicit and routine at the liability and remedies stages.
See generally Deepa Varadarajan, Improvement Doctrines, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 657
(2014).
11. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 2 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437, 438 (1990);
see also Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1582 (2002).
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short. By contrast, copyright law’s fair use doctrine protects a variety of
unauthorized but socially beneficial uses.12 Other parts of the copyright
statute provide certain safe harbors, such as exempting libraries from
liability for reproducing copyrighted works.13 Patent law is generally less
forgiving of unauthorized use than copyright. But patent limiting doctrines
like the reverse doctrine of equivalents, as well as recent changes to the
patent remedies analysis after the U.S. Supreme Court’s eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C.14 decision, direct courts to consider the social
benefits of a defendant’s unauthorized use in certain contexts.15
Trade secret law’s relative indifference both to cumulative innovation
concerns and First Amendment concerns contradicts intellectual property
law’s underlying quest for balance. That is, it ignores the role that
intellectual property’s limiting doctrines play in adjusting the scope of
exclusive rights to prevent both the overprotection and under-protection of
information.16
This discrepancy is particularly problematic because trade secrets have
become a significant portion of American companies’ market value.17
Certainly, trade secret law can help companies keep confidential
information out of the “wrong” hands—e.g., competitors that want to free
ride on owners’ efforts and provide directly competing products or
processes, thus depressing originators’ incentives to innovate. But
companies increasingly use trade secret law to shield information from
potential “right” hands—e.g., the scrutinizing eyes of government
regulators, consumers, public watchdog groups, and significant
improvers.18
Part of the reason trade secret protection is attractive to companies is its
ex ante flexibility (especially relative to patent law), coupled with its lack of
ex post limiting doctrines. That is, unlike patent, trade secret law has
expansive subject matter breadth, minimal substantive requirements, and no
formal application process before acquisition. In this way, it is similar to
copyright law, which also has few requirements on the front end.19 But
copyright law partners ex ante flexibility with robust limiting doctrines like
fair use that arose both to address First Amendment concerns and overcome
the market failures that would otherwise prevent socially beneficial uses of
12. Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Fair Use, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see infra Part
II.B.1.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 110.
14. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1183 (2002).
17. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 34, 35 (6th ed. 2012) (noting the particular importance of trade secrets
to small companies); Adam Cohen, Securing Trade Secrets in the Information Age:
Upgrading the Economic Espionage Act After United States v. Aleynikov, 30 YALE J. ON
REG. 189, 192 (2013) (noting that “as much as seventy percent of American firms’ market
value may lie in intellectual property, a significant part of which is trade secrets”).
18. See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 5; see also infra Part III.
19. See infra Part I.A.
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the work from taking place.20 I analyze this problematic doctrinal gap in
trade secret law and sketch a mechanism to fill it: a doctrine of trade secret
fair use.
In Part I, I compare the basic contours and theoretical underpinnings of
trade secret law to patent and copyright. Despite the divergent normative
accounts of trade secret law, judicial opinions and legal scholarship
increasingly theorize it as a subset of intellectual property because it shares
the utilitarian, incentive-promoting goals of patent and copyright. This part
also explores the pivotal role that scope-limiting doctrines play in
intellectual property—i.e., to help balance the social costs of exclusive
rights against their incentive-promoting benefits. After setting the stage in
Part I, Part II examines various scope-limiting doctrines in patent and
copyright law that encourage unauthorized but socially beneficial uses of
the protected information. These limits—particularly, copyright’s fair use
doctrine—stand in contrast to trade secret law.
In Part III, I provide a typology of trade secret cases where this paucity of
meaningful limits is particularly problematic: cases involving significant
follow-on “improvement” and cases involving the unauthorized disclosure
of information pertinent to public health, safety, and welfare. While trade
secret law is fairly undertheorized in legal scholarship, a handful of scholars
have described how trade secret law impedes public access to specific types
of information—for example, information relevant to environmental harms,
voting machine errors, search engine algorithms, and medical pricing
data.21 Part III builds upon these prior accounts but situates them in the
broader context of trade secret “fair uses.” Moreover, no previous work (to
my knowledge) has comprehensively addressed the failure of trade secret
law to sufficiently address cumulative innovation concerns—a topic that
has received much broader attention in the patent and copyright contexts.
Finally, Part IV sketches the contours of a multifactor “fair use” doctrine
for trade secret law and compares the benefits and drawbacks of this
mechanism to other potential policy reforms, like statutory safe harbors that
create specific exemptions or per se fair uses.
I. EX ANTE FLEXIBILITY AND EX POST LIMITATION:
COMPARING TRADE SECRET TO COPYRIGHT AND PATENT
“Intellectual property” law is an umbrella term used to describe discrete
legal doctrines—patent, copyright, trademark, and increasingly, trade secret
law—that govern the use of different kinds of information and insignia.
20. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 609.
21. See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 5; Levine, supra note 5; David S. Levine, What Can the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act Learn from the Bayh-Dole Act?, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 615 (2000);
Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and Access in an Innovation Intensive Economy: Reordering
Information Privileges in Environmental, Health, and Safety Law, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 465
(2007); Frank Pasquale, The Troubling Consequences of Trade Secret Protection of Search
Engine Rankings, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 381 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds.,
2011) [hereinafter TRADE SECRECY].
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Patent law protects certain categories of inventions that are useful, new, and
nonobvious in light of the previous knowledge (or “prior art”) and satisfy
various disclosure requirements. Copyright law protects original works of
authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression, including books,
paintings, photographs, songs, computer software, and movies. Trademark
law protects words and symbols that help to identify the source of the goods
or services (e.g., “Coca-Cola”). Trade secret law protects certain
confidential information that companies attempt to keep secret, including
both “technical” information (e.g., processes and formulas, like the formula
for Coca-Cola) and non-technological “business” information (e.g.,
customer lists).22
Though all are grouped under the banner of “intellectual property,” these
doctrines differ from each another in significant ways. These differences
are explained, at least in part, by the different subject matter they cover
(e.g., inventions versus creative works), as well as their different origins.
Patent and copyright laws have played an important role in American law
since the country’s birth. Both have a constitutional basis, and Congress
enacted patent and copyright legislation by the late eighteenth century.23 In
contrast, trade secret law was largely a nineteenth-century creation of
Anglo-American courts, evolving out of related common law torts (e.g.,
unfair competition) and legal rules governing the employment
relationship.24
Unlike patent, copyright, and trademark, which are protected primarily
by federal statute, trade secret is largely a creature of state law. Currently,
every state protects trade secrets.25 The 1939 Restatement (First) of Torts
described the basic principles of trade secret in the early twentieth century,
which most states then adopted.26 In 1979, a model state statute, the
22. See generally William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN
(Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001);

THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168
MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 25–31.
23. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall

have the power . . . to promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”); Copyright
Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2012)); Patent Act
of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2012)).
24. American courts did not recognize a cause of action for damages for trade secret
misappropriation until 1837. Injunctive relief for trade secret misappropriation was
recognized even later. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 35. As early as the Renaissance,
however, most European nation-states protected the secret processes and ideas of guild
cartels and other businesses from third-party usurpation. Id. at 34. Trademarks were
protected in the eighteenth century “only by the common law of fraud,” and Congress did
not enact the first federal trademark statute until 1870. Id. at 764.
25. Id. at 35.
26. See id. at 35. The Restatement (First) of Torts protected secret information “used in
one’s business” that gave its owner “an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
Interestingly, the 1979 Restatement (Second) of Torts omitted trade secret law “on the
grounds that [it] had developed into an independent body of law that no longer relied on
general principles of tort law.” MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 35–36. But the original
Restatement continues to influence trade secret law, as a number of state courts had relied
upon it prior to the Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA). Id. at 36.
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Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA) was promulgated.27 The UTSA has
since been enacted (in some form) by forty-seven states and the District of
Columbia.28 More recently, the American Law Institute’s Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition described trade secret doctrine.29
In the sections that follow, I compare the basic contours and theoretical
underpinnings of trade secret law to those of patent and copyright. Despite
trade secret law’s unique origin story, it is increasingly theorized as a subset
of intellectual property because it shares the incentive-promoting goals of
patent and copyright. Courts and scholars often justify patent, copyright,
and trade secret laws as mechanisms to encourage the invention or creation
of new technological advances and expressive works.30
A. Threshold Requirements for Protection
Trade secret and copyright laws impose few requirements on the front
end. No formal application process is required, and the substantive
requirements for obtaining protection are fairly minimal. By contrast,
patent law imposes a number of ex ante requirements. Inventors seeking
patent protection must submit a formal application to the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) that satisfies several substantive requirements of
patentability. I briefly discuss the threshold requirements for obtaining
protection under each of these categories.
1. Trade Secret
For trade secret protection, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
information at issue (1) falls within the subject matter of trade secret law
and (2) was subjected to reasonable secrecy precautions. The subject matter
requirement of trade secret law is very broad (almost comically so); it
includes “virtually any useful information,” so long as it has potential
27. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990).
28. See Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
Act.aspx?title=Trade+Secrets+Act (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). Massachusetts, New York,
and North Carolina have not adopted the UTSA. Id.; see also Christopher B. Seaman, The
Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript
at 33), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2397567 (noting that
“the UTSA’s widespread adoption has helped harmonize the substantive law governing trade
secrecy”). For a summary of state modifications to the UTSA, see generally 1 ROGER M.
MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[3] (2014).
29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39–45 (1995). The
Restatement (Third)’s definition of a trade secret, standard for misappropriation, and
remedial provisions are similar to the UTSA: it defines a trade secret broadly, encompassing
“any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that
is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over
others.” Id. § 39; see also id. § 39 cmt. b (“The concept of a trade secret . . . is intended to be
consistent with the definition of ‘trade secret’ in § 1(4) of the [UTSA].”). Despite its
relatively recent promulgation, the Restatement (Third) has had little impact on the
development of trade secret law; “[m]ost states have adopted the UTSA as statutory law, and
thus the Restatement (Third) is frequently disregarded.” Seaman, supra note 28, at 14.
30. Because trademark law is designed to do something quite different (i.e., to protect
distinctive marks used in commerce for the purpose of lowering consumer search costs), I do
not discuss it here. See, e.g., MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 21–22.
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economic value and is not generally known or readily ascertainable.31
Information is capable of adding economic value if, for example, it “makes
a product easier or cheaper to make, if it makes the product more attractive
to customers, or if it helps the producer target likely customers.”32 The “not
generally known” requirement means to exclude from trade secret
protection commonly known information within an industry.33 One
frequently cited difference between the definitions of a trade secret in the
UTSA and Restatement (First) of Torts is that the UTSA does not require
continuous use of the information.34
Gauging whether the owner took “reasonable” precautions to guard the
secrecy of the information is a fairly context-dependent inquiry. But
examples of reasonable secrecy measures include imposing confidentiality
agreements, restricting physical access, and incorporating password
protections.35 Notably, trade secret law does not require absolute secrecy
for protection; relative secrecy is sufficient. Thus, a trade secret owner can
share secret information with employees and outsiders to exploit the
secret’s commercial value, so long as the firm exercises some reasonable
diligence to prevent unauthorized disclosure or use of the secret.36
2. Trade Secret vs. Patent
To appreciate trade secret law’s subject matter breadth and ease of
acquisition, one need only compare it to patent law. To acquire a patent, an
inventor must submit an application to the PTO that demonstrates her
invention is patentable subject matter, useful, novel (i.e., different from the
prior art), nonobvious (i.e., more than a trivial step beyond the prior art),
and sufficiently described and enabled in the application so that others
skilled in the relevant art can understand, make, and use it.37 A PTO
examiner then checks that each requirement is met and negotiates with the
inventor over the proper wording and scope of the patent claims. “Claims”
31. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 1.01.
32. Eric R. Claeys, Private Law Theory and Corrective Justice in Trade Secrecy, 41 J.
TORT L. 1, 4 (2011); see, e.g., Metallurgical Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1201
(5th Cir. 1986). Under the UTSA definition, the information is not required to have actual
economic value to qualify for trade secret protection; even potential economic value is
sufficient. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
33. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 37.
34. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 5, 14 U.L.A. 439 (“The definition of ‘trade
secret’ contains a reasonable departure from the Restatement of Torts (First) definition
which required that a trade secret be ‘continuously used in one’s business.’ The broader
definition in the proposed Act extends protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an
opportunity or acquired means to put a trade secret to use.”).
35. See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus. Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th
Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.). Courts and scholars have offered various justifications for the
reasonable secrecy precautions requirement. Some view it as evidence of the trade secret’s
economic value (i.e., why bother guarding worthless information). Others view it as
evidence of the defendant’s wrongful acquisition. See, e.g., id. at 178–80 (discussing the
various purposes of a reasonable secrecy requirement).
36. See, e.g., Metallurgical Indus. Inc., 790 F.2d at 1200 (concluding that “a holder may
divulge his information to a limited extent without destroying its status as a trade secret”).
37. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2012).
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are numbered sentences that distinctly set out the boundaries of the
invention—the “metes and bounds” of the inventor’s right to exclude if the
patent issues.38 The written description and enablement requirements are
part of the quid pro quo for the grant of the patent; in exchange for the right
to exclude, the inventor’s disclosures add to the storehouse of public
knowledge.39
Trade secret law imposes none of these substantive requirements. The
absence of an absolute novelty requirement means that even if the trade
secret owner was not the first to conceive of the confidential information,
protection may nonetheless attach so long as the information is not
generally known or readily ascertainable within the industry.40 The absence
of a nonobviousness requirement means even slight variations to known
processes can qualify for trade secret protection.41 The absence of a utility
requirement means that even discoveries of what does not work—so-called
negative know-how—can qualify for trade secret protection.42 The absence
of patent law’s more circumscribed subject matter requirement means that
trade secret information need not be technological in nature; even business
information like customer lists, financial projections, pricing data, and
marketing plans can qualify for trade secret protections.43
Interestingly, early trade secrecy cases in the United States involved
more limited subject matter—e.g., secret manufacturing processes that
businesses tried to shield from competitors. For example, an early seminal
trade secret case, Peabody v. Norfolk,44 involved a secret industrial process
for making gunny cloth. In modern times, however, companies invoke
trade secrecy law to guard a seemingly endless array of information not just
from competitors but also from consumers and regulators.45 The expansive

38. Id. § 112.
39. Some commentators, however, have questioned the usefulness of patent disclosures
to future innovators. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539,
560 (2009).
40. See Claeys, supra note 32, at 4–5; see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i)
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
41. See, e.g., Metallurgical Indus. Inc., 790 F.2d at 1202 (observing that the trade secret
may even include secret combinations of publicly known items); SI Handling Sys., Inc. v.
Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1256 (3d Cir. 1985) (explaining that a trade secret “may be no more
than ‘merely a mechanical improvement that a good mechanic can make’” (quoting
Schmidinger v. Welsh, 383 F.2d 455, 466 n.14 (3d Cir. 1967))).
42. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 439 (“The definition [of a trade
secret] includes information that has commercial value from a negative viewpoint, for
example the results of lengthy and expensive research which proves that a certain process
will not work could be of great value to a competitor.”); see also Charles Tait Graves, The
Law of Negative Knowledge: A Critique, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 387, 389 (2007)
(arguing that trade secret claims based on negative knowledge should be treated skeptically
and rejected whenever possible).
43. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 1.01, at 1-1, 1-5 to -6. The subject matter of patent law is
limited to any “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
44. 98 Mass. 452 (1868).
45. See infra Part III.B.
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reach of modern trade secret law has led a number of commentators to
bemoan its subject matter breadth.46
3. Trade Secret vs. Copyright
Copyright is closer to the trade secret end of the spectrum than patent, in
terms of ex ante requirements. Copyright law does not impose a formal
application process. Works are protected as soon as they are created.
Historically, copyright law required notice and registration, but it does no
longer.47 For work to be copyrightable, it must satisfy a low threshold of
originality (i.e., be independently created and exhibit a “modicum of
creativity”) and be fixed in a tangible medium of expression.48
Thus, like trade secret and unlike patent, “copyright is rather
indiscriminate, awarded by operation of law to authors whose works meet
the minimal statutory requirements and regardless of whether the public
will benefit from disclosure and dissemination of the copyrighted work.”49
Usually, the trickier issue is determining the scope of copyright
protection—a question that is usually answered in the context of
infringement litigation, by comparing the copyrighted work to the allegedly
infringing work.50
4. Relative “Strength” and Duration of the Right to Exclude
Given these differences in threshold requirements, it is perhaps
unsurprising that patent rights are “stronger” in nature. A patent is harder
to obtain, but once granted, the owner can exclude others from making,
using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented invention. This
right to exclude extends even to those who independently create the
invention.51
In contrast, a copyright excludes only “copiers,” not independent creators
of a work. Copyright owners have exclusive rights to reproduce the work,
to prepare derivative works based on the original, and to distribute,
perform, and display the work to the public.52 Similarly, trade secret law
does not constrain independent creators. Under trade secret law, the owner
can only exclude “misappropriators”—i.e., those who acquire, use, or

46. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
47. This lessening of formalities has made it more difficult for potential users to locate
rights-holders. See Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About
Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1327–28 (2008). Registration of a copyrighted
work is, however, a prerequisite to filing an infringement action. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2012).
48. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346
(1991).
49. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1185.
50. See infra Part II.B.
51. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012); see also Clarissa Long, Information Costs in Patent and
Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 525–33 (2004).
52. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
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disclose the information in breach of a confidentiality duty (e.g., a departing
employee) or through “improper means.”53
In addition to a patent’s relative strength—or perhaps because of it—
patent rights are the most time-limited of the lot. The patent term generally
lasts twenty years from the date of filing.54 In contrast, copyright
protection lasts much longer—usually, the author’s life plus seventy
years.55 And trade secrets may last longer still, as they have no set time
limit (e.g., the over-century-old Coca-Cola formula). Trade secrets do not
expire after a particular term of years but continue indefinitely until the
secret is publicly disclosed.56
Because patent law relies on the PTO’s ex ante evaluation of an
invention’s benefit to society, “[i]t is relatively less amenable than
copyright to adjusting the scope of the right once granted.”57 That said,
patent law does impose some ex post limits. For example, the reverse
doctrine of equivalents and experimental use defenses (though narrowly
applied) can excuse defendants from liability due to certain socially
beneficial uses of the patented invention.58 More recently, in the wake of
the Supreme Court’s 2006 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C. decision,59
courts increasingly consider a patent defendant’s socially beneficial use
when assessing remedies.
Copyright law imposes more rigorous ex post limits than patent—
notably, the fair use defense.60 Curiously, trade secret law, which is similar
to copyright in terms of easy acquisition and subject matter breadth, does
not have a comparable fair use doctrine. Although trade secret law has a
reverse engineering defense (which has been analogized to copyright fair
use61), it is inapplicable in a number of cumulative innovation and First
Amendment contexts.62 Trade secret law’s relative indifference to the
defendant’s beneficial use of proprietary information can be contrasted with
copyright law—and, to a lesser degree, patent law.

53. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990); see also
Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 12
(2007).
54. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 302.
56. MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 58; see also Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate
Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 623 (2013) (arguing that trade secret’s
perpetual nature makes it a preferable form of protection for corporations, which are also
perpetual in nature).
57. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1185.
58. See infra Part II.A.1–2 (discussing the reverse doctrine of equivalents and
experimental use defenses).
59. See infra Part II.A.3.
60. See infra Part II.B.1.
61. See Richard A. Posner, Transaction Costs and Antitrust Concerns in the Licensing of
Intellectual Property, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 328 (2005) (noting “[t]he
counterpart to fair use in trade secret law is the right to unmask a trade secret by reverse
engineering”).
62. See infra Part III.
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B. Understanding Theoretical Underpinnings
The scope-limiting doctrines of patent, copyright, and trade secret are
discussed in Part II. Before exploring these limiting doctrines, however, it
is important to understand the theoretical underpinnings of patent,
copyright, and trade secret, for one cannot understand why trade secret law
warrants ex post limits without first understanding the purposes that these
intellectual property laws are meant to serve.
1. Incentives Justification of Patent and Copyright Laws
The primary justification for patent and copyright laws in the United
States is a utilitarian one: to provide economic incentives to create. Patents
and copyrights are viewed as tools to correct the public goods problem
inherent in information production. Information is nonrivalrous (i.e.,
consumption by more than one person does not deplete the amount
available to others) and nonexcludable (i.e., once information embodied in a
book or patented invention is released, it is hard to exclude others from its
benefits absent payment). Thus, by obtaining rights to exclude for a set
period of time, creators and inventors can recoup their investments, and
society is guarded against the underproduction of information-based
goods.63
But rights to exclude impose social costs as well, including “the
deadweight loss of monopoly pricing and the resulting limitations of
dissemination.”64 Inventions and creative works are by their very nature
cumulative—they build on prior works. Thus, intellectual property law
aims to strike a balance between rewarding the originator of a particular
invention or creative work, without stifling the ability of second-comers to
create new works. Since copyright law restricts access to creative and
intellectual works, it must also contend with First Amendment concerns,
like “protecting political speech, promoting democracy or self-government,
furthering the search for truth, or enhancing autonomy and enabling selfexpression.”65
Given this quest for balance, patents and copyrights are limited in scope
and duration. These limitations allow others to freely use protected works
once intellectual property rights have expired, to improve on existing
works, and to comment on and criticize existing works.66 Through its
63. This theory is emphasized both in the Constitution and numerous judicial decisions.
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power to enact patent and copyright
laws “to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts”); see also WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW 74–76 (2003) (explaining intellectual property law’s optimization task). The
descriptive and prescriptive limitations of this theory—in capturing the actual dynamics of
creation—are a matter of spirited debate among intellectual property scholars.
64. MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 16.
65. Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech
and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 538 (2004); see also Edward Lee,
Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 813 (2010).
66. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEX. L. REV. 989, 991 (1997).
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threshold requirements and ex post limiting doctrines, copyright and patent
laws “seek[], in the aggregate, to guard against both over- and
underprotection of information relative to the social optimum and the
concomitant social costs associated with each state.”67 To achieve this
balance, copyright and patent laws use both statutory provisions and
common law doctrines to adjust the scope of owners’ rights.
As discussed in the previous section, copyright does not ask many
questions ex ante, before the initial grant, while patent does. But in both
contexts, the role of ex post limits has become increasingly important.68
Intellectual property rights have increased in breadth, scope, duration, and
strength in recent decades. This trend is reflected most vividly perhaps by
Congress’s twenty-year extension of the copyright term.69 Historically,
intellectual property’s quest for balance and concomitant limits were built
into the shape of the initial grant (e.g., a shorter term of protection for
copyright). But that seems less true today. Thus, attention is increasingly
shifting to the post-grant stage of intellectual property rights—i.e., shaping
liability and remedy determinations to assure that intellectual property law
continues to “serve the finite, instrumental function it was designed to
serve.”70 In this Article, I argue that these concerns also apply to trade
secret law, despite the muddier nature of trade secret law’s theoretical
underpinnings, which are discussed in the next section.
2. Competing Theories of Trade Secret Law
The theoretical justifications and normative foundations for protecting
trade secrets have puzzled courts and scholars for over a century.71
Because of trade secret law’s unique characteristics—including the
requirement of relative secrecy and its concern with how the defendant
obtains the information (i.e., misappropriation)72—it has proven difficult to
elicit scholarly agreement on the theoretical justifications for trade secret
law and its place within existing legal doctrine. The confusion surrounding
trade secret law has earned it colorful nicknames, from “the Cinderella of

67. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1183.
68. Varadarajan, supra note 10, at 665–66.
69. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 108, 203, 301–304 (2012)). Thus, while the
original U.S. copyright term was fourteen years (with a fourteen-year renewal term), the
current term is the life of the author plus seventy years.
70. Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm,
54 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (2004); see also David Fagundes, Efficient Copyright Infringement, 98
IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1800 (2013) (“As copyright trends in a more expansive direction, the
likelihood that unauthorized uses may be formally infringing but still socially beneficial
grows ever greater.”).
71. Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets As IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311, 312–14 (2008).
72. Unlike trade secrets, copyrights and patents are said to confer property rights
“against the world”; that is, for the most part, they prohibit unauthorized use regardless of
the relationship between the parties or how the information is obtained. See infra Part II.C.
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the intellectual property law field,”73 to a “chameleon,”74 to a “real toad[] in
a conceptual garden.”75
One predominant view “emphasizes deterrence of wrongful acts and is
therefore sometimes described as a tort theory” of trade secret law.76 Under
this tort view, “the aim of trade secret law is to punish and prevent illicit
behavior, and even to uphold reasonable standards of commercial
behavior.”77 The Supreme Court embraced such a view in an early
twentieth century case, E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland.78
In that case, the Court viewed as the “starting point” of the offense the
defendant’s acquisition of information through his “confidential relations
with the plaintiffs,” rather than whether the information at issue qualified as
a trade secret.79
The tort-based view of trade secret found voice in the 1939 Restatement
(First) of Torts.80 In its “ultimate expression,” the tort view would replace
an independent trade secret law with “a general tort of wrongful
misappropriation of information.”81 While the tort view continues to have
some traction with courts and scholars,82 its detractors emphasize the

73. Sharon K. Sandeen, The Cinderella of Intellectual Property Law, in 2 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 399
(Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).
74. Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon, or Intellectual Property Olympian? A
Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69 (1999).
75. Todd M. Sloan, Trade Secrets: Real Toads in a Conceptual Garden, 1 W. ST. U. L.
REV. 113 (1973).
76. Lemley, supra note 71, at 319. Related to the tort-based view, another recurring
explanation for trade secret law during much of the twentieth century has been norm-based:
to maintain “standards of commercial ethics,” Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470, 481 (1974), and “to recognize and enforce higher standards of commercial morality in
the business world,” E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015
(5th Cir. 1970) (quoting Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 773 (Tex. 1958)). See
also Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in
Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800–1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J.
441, 446 (2001) (describing the historical role of commercial morality in trade secret law).
77. Lemley, supra note 71, at 319.
78. 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
79. Id. at 102. The Court explained:
The word property as applied to . . . trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression of
certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some
rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable
secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special
confidence that he accepted. The property may be denied but the confidence
cannot be.
Id.
80. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939) (noting that trade secret law
is different from patent and copyright because “[i]t is the employment of improper means to
procure the trade secret, rather than the mere copying or use, which is the basis of the
liability under the rule stated in this Section”). See generally id. §§ 757–759.
81. Lemley, supra note 71, at 321.
82. See, e.g., Chiappetta, supra note 74, at 73 (arguing that trade secret law is best
explained and rationalized by reference to tort law); Pamela Samuelson, Information As
Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual
Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 366 (1989) (advocating the tort view); see also C.
Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the Misappropriation Doctrine: Common Law
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unprincipled line-drawing the tort view invites: instead of resolving
“challenges on any principled basis,” courts make “ad hoc judgments based
on their perception of the defendant’s intent.”83 Interestingly, the 1979
Restatement (Second) of Torts omitted trade secret law “on the grounds that
[it] had developed into an independent body of law that no longer relied on
general principles of tort law.”84
Another predominant theory justifying trade secret law has been the
property theory—i.e., that trade secrets are property rights, owned and
possessed by the plaintiff.85 Under this view, “[t]he starting point . . . is not
whether there was a confidential relationship, but whether, in fact, there was
a trade secret to be misappropriated.”86 The property view of trade secret
was dominant in the nineteenth century,87 before Masland and the ascent of
the tort view. The Supreme Court revived the property view in Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co.88
Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 55, 56, 59 (1987) (proposing an
extension of the tort view of trade secrets).
83. Lemley, supra note 71, at 322; see id. at 322–23 (noting the tort theory “leaves a
zone of uncertainty around business behavior that is likely to discourage robust competition
by companies who fear that competition may later be deemed unfair” and “may also have
similar deterrent effects on departing employees”); see also Claeys, supra note 32, at 7
(arguing that the tort view is “obviously unsatisfying” because “‘improper means’ gets
specification from some set of normative principles alien to tort”).
84. MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 35–36; see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
85. Lemley, supra note 71, at 324. See generally Miguel Deutch, The Property Concept
of Trade Secrets in Anglo-American Law: An Ongoing Debate, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 313
(1997) (offering a critical analysis of trade secrets as property). A few courts and
commentators have offered a “contract view” of trade secret law, suggesting that trade secret
law is (or ought to be) synonymous with contract. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at
Trade Secret Law: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 243 (1998).
However, as detractors of this theory have noted, a contract-based theory is descriptively
incomplete as it cannot account for the subset of trade secret cases that establish rights
between strangers who have no contractual privity—e.g., “improper means” cases and cases
in which a trade secret is acquired by accident or mistake. See, e.g., Claeys, supra note 32, at
11; Lemley, supra note 71, at 323.
86. Van Prods. Co. v. Gen. Welding & Fabricating Co., 213 A.2d 769, 780 (Pa. 1965).
87. The property view is sometimes traced to Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868),
a seminal nineteenth-century trade secret case. Peabody claimed a secret process for
manufacturing gunny cloth and sought to enjoin a former employee, Norfolk, who had quit
and begun planning to build a competing factory. The court justified its grant of injunctive
relief on the existence of a property right, observing:
If [a man] invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of manufacture,
whether a proper subject for a patent or not, he has not indeed an exclusive right to
it as against the public, or against those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it;
but he has a property in it, which a court of chancery will protect against one who
in violation of contract and breach of confidence undertakes to apply it to his own
use, or to disclose it to third persons.
Id. at 458. In these early American trade secret cases, however, the label “property” likely
“meant something rather different than it means to many people today, and often little more
than that the right was to be protected by the injunctive power of courts in equity.” Lemley,
supra note 71, at 324.
88. 467 U.S. 986 (1984); see id. at 1002–03 (holding that trade secrets are property
under the Fifth Amendment takings inquiry); see also Cohen, supra note 17, at 195 (“In
time, this malfeasance-based [or tort-based] view of trade secret theft went into retreat, and
the law looped back toward a property-based theory.”). But see Claeys, supra note 32, at 9
(suggesting that the “property view remains out of favor”).
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In Monsanto, the Court addressed whether a federal law requiring
Monsanto to publicly disclose its trade secrets was a Fifth Amendment
“taking of private property” that merited compensation.89 In holding that
trade secrets were property for takings purposes, the Court explained:
“Trade secrets have many of the characteristics of more tangible forms of
property,” like assignability, and a “perception of trade secrets as property
is consonant with a notion of ‘property’ that extends beyond land and
tangible goods and includes the products of an individual’s ‘labor and
invention.’”90 A number of federal and state court decisions describe trade
secrets as a form of “property,”91 and the 1979 UTSA, enacted by a
majority of states, is also said to embody a property view of trade secrets.92
The property view of trade secrets (and the Supreme Court’s
characterization in Monsanto) has come under fire from various quarters.93
Some of these criticisms echo those levied against property
characterizations of any informational assets (including patents, copyrights,
and trademarks). For example, critics of the property view emphasize the
inherent differences between trade secrets and tangible property. That is,
like other forms of information, trade secrets are not rivalrously consumed,
so there is no danger of overuse or of a “tragedy of the commons,” in the
tangible property sense.94
Commentators have also criticized the use of tangible property metaphors
in the trade secret context (as in other information contexts) because such
property-speak seems to bolster normative claims that owners should have
stronger rights to exclude.95 In previous work, however, I have argued that
such criticisms of property metaphors misperceive property law. Far from
being exclusively fixated on exclusion, a number of tangible property law
doctrines “seek[] to balance exclusionary rights of owners against
competing equity and efficiency concerns.”96 And in the trade secret
context, it is the tort-based approach that may, in fact, have an expanding
89. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 998–1004.
90. Id. at 1002–03.
91. See 1 MILGRIM, supra note 28, §§ 2.01–.02 (listing cases describing trade secrets as
property).
92. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 71, at 324–25; Lynn C. Tyler, Trade Secrets in
Indiana: Property vs. Relationship, 31 IND. L. REV. 339, 339 (1998).
93. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 82, at 366.
94. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).
95. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 82, at 398–400 (critiquing the U.S. Supreme
Court’s property characterization of trade secrets in Monsanto and observing that “the word
property is a very powerful metaphor that radically changes the stakes in legal disputes”);
see also Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property As Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1756–57 (2007) (describing others’ criticisms of the
property analogy).
96. Varadarajan, supra note 10, at 665. In recent years, a number of intellectual
property law scholars have begun to highlight the relevance of tangible property law to
intellectual property law discourse by emphasizing the various limits tangible property law
imposes on owners. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 70, at 47–48; Peter Lee, The Accession
Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 175, 193 (2011); Molly
Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 906 (2008). See generally
ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011).
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(rather than, cabining) effect, because “[c]ourts that think of trade secret
law as a common law tort . . . are apt to overlook” the substantive
requirements of demonstrating a valid trade secret “in their zeal to reach
‘bad actors.’”97
A few scholars, like Pamela Samuelson, have also attacked the property
view of trade secret because the law’s concern with the plaintiff’s
reasonable secrecy efforts and the defendant’s method of acquisition
prevents a trade secret from being a “good against the world” in the tangible
property sense.98 However, other types of intellectual property, like
copyrights and trademarks, also require ongoing acts by owners for
protection (e.g., continued use in one’s business for trademark protection)
and certain acts by defendants (e.g., copying in copyright) before liability
will attach.
3. Utilitarian Justification: Trade Secret As Intellectual Property
Increasingly, courts and scholars emphasize trade secret’s proper role as
a subset of intellectual property because, like patent or copyright, the grant
of exclusivity is meant to combat the underproduction of information-based
goods.99 In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,100 for example, the Supreme
Court identified the incentive-to-invent justification as a key purpose of
trade secret law. Holding that patent law did not preempt trade secret law,
the Court explained:
[T]he patent policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed by the
existence of another form of incentive to invention. . . . Trade secret law
will encourage invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and
will prompt the independent innovator to proceed with the discovery and

97. Lemley, supra note 71, at 313–14; see also Tyler, supra note 92, at 340–41.
98. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Privacy As Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1125, 1153 & n.148 (2000); see also Claeys, supra note 32, at 9–10.
99. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979) (observing
that trade secret law helps ensure that “the public is not deprived of the use of valuable, if
not quite patentable, invention[s]” (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
485 (1974))); Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir.
1991) (explaining trade secret law’s role in providing “incentives to invest resources in
discovering more efficient methods of production”); DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75
P.3d 1, 13 (Cal. 2003) (“By creating a limited property right in information, trade secret law
‘acts as an incentive for investment in innovation’” (quoting Andrew Beckerman-Rodau,
Prior Restraints and Intellectual Property: The Clash Between Intellectual Property and the
First Amendment from an Economic Perspective, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 1, 60 (2001))); Cohen, supra note 17, at 196 (noting that courts “often analyze the
protection of trade secrets the way they analyze protecting patent or copyright, emphasizing
the social benefits of rules that promote innovation”); Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional
Protection of Trade Secrets Under the Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 58 (2004);
Schwartz, supra note 56, at 632 (noting that “[t]here is essentially only one policy purpose
behind trade secret law: the encouragement of innovation”). But see Risch, supra note 53, at
26 (arguing that “creating incentives to innovate is a very minor justification of trade secret
law”).
100. 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974).
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exploitation of his invention. Competition is fostered and the public is not
deprived of the use of valuable, if not quite patentable, invention.101

Indeed, the broad definition of a trade secret allows it to reach into places
patent law cannot (e.g., business, as opposed to technical information, and
“negative know-how”). And trade secrets are significantly cheaper than the
costly patent application process, which is why “some firms, particularly
start-ups, rely heavily on the incentive to invent provided by trade secret
law.”102 But some have questioned the adequacy of the incentive-to-invent
explanation for trade secret law. For instance, firms have adequate
incentives to create certain trade secret-protected information even in the
absence of trade secret law—e.g., customer lists, marketing data, and
negative know-how.103 (Though the same may be said of certain kinds of
patentable information as well.104) And to some extent, “trade secret law
runs the risk of undermining the socially beneficial incentives of the patent
system,” as it is premised on secrecy rather than disclosure.105
Interestingly, Mark Lemley has recently argued that trade secrets are best
understood as intellectual property rights not only because they promote
inventive activity (i.e., by encouraging invention in areas where patent law
does not reach) but also because they promote disclosure of that activity.106
The disclosure function is also an important purpose of intellectual property
law.107 Patent law, for example, requires an applicant to describe her
invention so that a person of ordinary skill in the field can make and use it,
and it requires that the information be published.108 While trade secret
protection seems to cut in the opposite direction—as the right is conditioned
on relative secrecy—Lemley argues that it actually reduces over-investment
in secrecy. This over-investment may take the form of increased walls and
fences or business decisions that restrict the flow of information between
potential partners or new employees.109 Trade secret law developed as a
(partial) substitute for these restrictions. In this way, trade secret law may
“encourage[] disclosure of information that companies might otherwise be

101. Id. at 484–85 (emphasis added).
102. Lemley, supra note 71, at 331.
103. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 85, at 272.
104. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 651 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“Many have expressed serious doubts about whether patents are necessary to encourage
business innovation. . . . ‘[C]ompanies have ample incentives to develop business methods
even without patent protection . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting Dan L. Burk & Mark
A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1618 (2003))).
105. Bone, supra note 85, at 270; see also Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations
of Trade Secret Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1807–10 (2014) (reiterating the concerns raised
in his original article).
106. See generally Lemley, supra note 71.
107. Id. at 332.
108. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
109. Lemley, supra note 71, at 335 (“Examples can be found as far back as the guild
system . . . . [I]n the absence of legal means to protect [technical] knowledge [guilds] went
to great lengths to prevent others from learning of it, imposing draconian limits on the
mobility of employees . . . .”).
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reluctant to share for fear of losing the competitive advantage it
provides.”110
These incentive-based justifications for trade secret law are not without
their critics.111 But the “intellectual property view” of trade secrets
increasingly reflects the modern view. Trade secrets are routinely described
and treated as a form of intellectual property by courts, scholars, and
practitioners. Despite this characterization, however, trade secret law does
not have limiting doctrines akin to those of patent and copyright—i.e.,
doctrines sufficiently attuned to cumulative innovation and First
Amendment concerns.
II. DEFINING AND LIMITING THE SCOPE OF EXCLUSIONARY RIGHTS
Scope-limiting doctrines in intellectual property law mitigate the risk of
overprotection. In theory, they try to reconcile owners’ rights to exclude
with the public’s interest in furthering innovation and access. One
particular concern of limiting doctrines in intellectual property is the issue
of cumulative innovation—i.e., new works that build on existing works. As
Maureen O’Rourke observes, “[v]irtually since their inception, both the
copyright and patent laws have grappled with the question of how to
safeguard the incentive inherent in the grant of exclusive rights while at the
same time allowing second-comers to build on prior works.”112
Patent law’s limiting features, like the reverse doctrine of equivalents113
and recent developments in patent remedies, largely arose to address these
cumulative innovation concerns. These limitations supplement the legwork
done by patent’s onerous ex ante requirements (and the reevaluation of
patent validity by courts).114 Limiting doctrines in copyright like the ideaexpression dichotomy and the doctrine of fair use also arose, in large part,
to address these cumulative innovation concerns.115 So, too, did trade
secret’s reverse engineering defense.116 In the copyright and trade secret
contexts, however, limiting doctrines must do more of the heavy lifting,
because the ex ante requirements are minimal. Copyright law is thus a
particularly useful point of comparison for trade secret law. As I
110. Id. at 335–36; see also Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174,
177 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that “disclosure . . . is often necessary to the efficient exploitation
of a trade secret”).
111. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 85, at 273 (criticizing this incentive-based justification
for “ignor[ing] enforcement costs and underestimat[ing] the transaction costs of licensing,
both of which are likely to be especially high when secret information is involved”); see also
Bone, supra note 105, at 1809 (noting that “even if trade secret law limits the precautionstealing arms race, it adds a new detection-avoidance arms race”).
112. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1180.
113. See infra Part II.A.1.
114. In patent infringement cases, defendants often invoke the invalidity of the patent.
Thus, courts must reassess the validity of a patent in the context of patent infringement
litigation. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
115. See infra Part II.B; see also O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1180 (noting that copyright
fair use arose “in part, and is justified, as a mechanism to overcome market failures that
would otherwise prevent socially desirable uses of the protected work from occurring”).
116. See infra Part II.C.1.
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demonstrate in the sections that follow, trade secret’s limiting doctrines are
insufficiently solicitous of cumulative improvement.
In addition to cumulative innovation concerns, copyright’s fair use
defense also arose to reconcile copyright with First Amendment purposes,
like promoting public commentary and debate.117 Because patent law
focuses on technological inventions as protectable subject matter rather than
expressive works, the First Amendment does not pose much of a concern—
or doctrinal challenge—in patent law. Trade secret law, however, with its
staggering subject matter breadth, straddles the line between the two. But it
has no comparable limiting doctrine to accommodate First Amendment
concerns.118
A. Cumulative Innovation and Limiting Doctrines in Patent Law
To understand the role that limiting doctrines play in patent law, one
must first understand the basics of patent infringement analysis and the role
of patent claims. Because patent claims mark the “metes and bounds” of
the owner’s right to exclude, patent infringement analysis looks to the
claims rather than what the patentee has built or is selling. To infringe a
patent, the accused product or process must contain each and every element
identified in the patent claim (or its equivalent).119 As a result, an accused
product can “literally infringe” (i.e., fall within the literal language of a
claim), even if the defendant makes a different and better product than the
inventor. Even if a defendant’s product or process does not literally
infringe the claims of a patent, the doctrine of equivalents can expand the
reach of a patent to encompass “insubstantial differences.”120 Patent claims
can thus “reach new and unanticipated inventions made after the patent
issues.”121
Potential users and follow-on improvers face significant uncertainty
regarding the scope of a patent and whether it encompasses their desired
uses. Sometimes, subsequent innovators cannot avoid falling within the
claims’ literal terrain, because the claims are broadly defined or “because
economic or technical necessity requires that the improver hew closely to
the work of the original creator in some basic respect.”122 Patents can thus
frustrate cumulative innovation and retard the efforts of those who seek to
improve existing inventions.123
117. See Tushnet, supra note 65, at 538.
118. For a discussion of conflicts between trade secret law and the First Amendment, see
generally Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and
the First Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 777 (2007). See also Mark A. Lemley & Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J.
147, 165 (1998).
119. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29–30 (1997).
120. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 959–60 (2007); Lemley, supra note 66, at 1004.
121. Lemley, supra note 66, at 1005.
122. Id. at 991.
123. Cumulative innovation is not a monolithic concept. In patent law, it can mean
inventing a better functioning or more efficient version of an existing invention. In this way,
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In assessing patent infringement, courts generally do not consider the
value of the infringer’s contribution—for example, if an existing product or
process is made more efficient or commercially valuable.124 Since it is the
language of the patent’s claims, rather than what the inventor has actually
built, that defines the boundaries of the right to exclude, an inventor can
expand the bounds of his patent right by drafting broad claims. To be sure,
a patentee’s ability to draft broad claims is cabined by the various
requirements of patentability (e.g., novelty, nonobviousness, enablement,
and written description).125 And in the context of infringement litigation,
courts can reassess the PTO’s decision to grant a patent—i.e., the validity of
the patent.126
But provided the requirements of patentability are met, subsequent
innovators seeking to incorporate or build upon the patented invention must
be careful to avoid infringing upon the claims’ literal terrain. It may be that
the subsequent innovator’s contribution is significant enough to merit a
patent on the improvement. Even then, however, the subsequent innovator
cannot practice the patent absent a license from the original patentee.127
Provided licensing markets operate efficiently, subsequent innovators can
obtain licenses from originators, and improvements will find their way to
the marketplace. And where the subsequent innovator has a patent on the
improvement, she comes into the negotiation game with some power of her
own because the original patentee cannot practice the improvement without
getting the improver’s permission.128 This so-called “blocking patents”
situation is thought to encourage a cross-licensing agreement between the
parties, so both can practice the improved invention.129
However, a number of scholars have persuasively illustrated the various
challenges to efficient licensing that can impede holders of “blocking
patents” from successfully negotiating a license. These challenges include:
identifying the relevant parties; uncertainty as to patents’ value and scope;
and strategic behavior that is exacerbated in the context of bilateral
the later innovator “designs over” an existing patent, perhaps without any awareness that the
prior invention exists or is patented. Lee, supra note 96, at 184. Commentators have referred
to interference with this kind of cumulative innovation as an “intergenerational bottleneck,”
which occurs where “each product generation builds on its predecessor.” Carrier, supra note
70, at 46–47. Cumulative innovation can also mean finding a new use for a patented
invention or using patented inventions “as inputs into producing other inventions.” Lee,
supra note 96, at 184. Some commentators have referred to interference with this kind of
innovation as an “intragenerational bottleneck,” which occurs when “one product contains
multiple patented components and one of the patent holders refuses to license one of the
patented parts,” thus preventing the practice of the product. Carrier, supra note 70, at 46; see
also Burk & Lemley, supra note 104, at 1657–58.
124. Lemley, supra note 66, at 1006–08.
125. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 844 & n.21 (1990); see also Lemley, supra note 66, at 1001–
02.
126. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
127. Lemley, supra note 66, at 1009–10.
128. Id. at 1007–13 (offering a useful framework for understanding how patent law
differentiates between “minor” and more “significant” technological improvements).
129. See id. at 1009–10.
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monopolies and that can obstruct agreement, even where there is a
cooperative surplus.130 Absent a license from the originator, the subsequent
innovator whose contribution has been deemed significant enough to merit
a patent is out of luck—i.e., she cannot practice the improvement patent and
reap the benefits of her productive efforts.
Given these cumulative innovation concerns, certain limiting doctrines in
patent law consider whether the socially beneficial nature of the defendant’s
use should excuse liability or alter the remedial preference for injunctive
relief.131
1. Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents
One such limiting doctrine is the “reverse doctrine of equivalents”
(RDOE), a mechanism by which courts can theoretically excuse “radical”
improvers from infringement liability.132 Under the RDOE, a literal
infringer can be excused from liability where her product is “so far changed
in principle from a patented article that it performs the same or a similar
function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the
literal words of the claim.”133
The Supreme Court introduced the RDOE in Westinghouse v. Boyden
Power Brake Co.134 Boyden was accused of infringing Westinghouse’s
patent on a train brake. But Boyden’s brake offered vastly superior
stopping power compared to its predecessors, allowing the long trains of the
nineteenth century to be operated more safely.135 Unfortunately for
Boyden, Westinghouse’s patent was worded broadly, and Boyden’s
improvement fell within the literal language of Westinghouse’s claims. The
Court refused to find infringement, however, setting forth a new exception
to liability.136
Commentators have suggested that in the context of radical
improvements (e.g., a train brake with far superior stopping capability),
courts should be unwilling to tolerate the possibility of market failure (e.g.,
bargaining breakdown between patent owner and improver) and the
resulting dampening of incentives for inventors to improve radically on
existing patented technologies.137 Courts can thus use the RDOE as a

130. See, e.g., id. at 1048–61; Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and
Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 84–91 (1994)
(describing licensing failures between pioneer patent holders and improvers in the early
radio and steel industries and the resulting social welfare losses).
131. Several commentators, however, have argued that existing ex post limiting doctrines
in patent law are too narrow and have suggested various reforms to expand these limiting
doctrines. See, e.g., O’Rourke, supra note 16 (proposing a fair use–type defense to patent
infringement); Katherine Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265, 289
(2011) (proposing a fair use–type infringement exception).
132. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 66, at 1010–13; Merges, supra note 130, at 78.
133. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608–09 (1950).
134. 170 U.S. 537 (1898).
135. Id. at 545.
136. Id. at 568, 573.
137. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 66, at 1010–13; Merges, supra note 130, at 91.
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policy lever to “benefit[] radical improvers at the expense of the original
patentee, and so encourage[] radical improvements.”138 Even absent court
action, the RDOE may “provide the infringer with a negotiation threat
credible enough to increase the probability that the parties will conclude a
licensing agreement.”139 In recent times, however, courts rarely apply the
RDOE,140 which has prompted calls to resuscitate the doctrine.141
2. Experimental Use Defenses
To some extent, experimental use defenses also consider an infringing
defendant’s socially beneficial use of a patented invention. The statutory
experimental use defense excuses drug manufacturers from infringement
liability for uses of another’s patent that are “reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.”142 This defense allows
drug manufacturers to use others’ patented inventions when testing drugs
they are planning to submit for the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA)
approval.143 In addition, the common law defense of experimental use
permits one to use another’s patented invention solely for purposes of
scientific inquiry.144 This defense is quite narrow, in that it does not apply
to uses for any commercial, financial, or reputational gain.145 Historically,
138. Lemley, supra note 66, at 1012–13.
139. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1194.
140. Scholars have observed that the RDOE is “seldom used” and “largely moribund.”
Lee, supra note 96, at 189; Merges, supra note 130, at 91. In 2002, the Federal Circuit
appeared to sound the RDOE’s death knell. See Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface
Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002). But it has since backed away
from such forceful disavowals of the RDOE’s continuing applicability. Recently, in Depuy
Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamore Danek, Inc., the Federal Circuit recognized the continuing
viability of the doctrine but nonetheless emphasized the rarity of its application. 567 F.3d
1314, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In this case, the district court imposed a significant penalty
on the defendant for raising an RDOE argument. See id. at 1322. The Federal Circuit
reversed, explaining that the “unusual nature of the [RDOE] is not itself a reason to sanction
a party for invoking it. The Supreme Court has recognized it to be a viable defense, even if
it is rarely asserted.” Id. at 1339.
141. See, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 125, at 864–68; Varadarajan, supra note 10,
at 689–91, 707–09.
142. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012). Originally, this provision was enacted in the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 § 202, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–302
(2012).
143. This permission to use another’s patent even extends to preclinical and other
experiments that the manufacturer decided not to present to the FDA. See Merck KGaA v.
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206–08 (2005); see also Momenta Pharm., Inc. v.
Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (extending the defense to
post-approval experiments).
144. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining the
defense does not extend to uses “in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s . . . business
and . . . not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical
inquiry”).
145. See id.; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1989) (proposing an
expansion of this defense to “exempt[] the use of patented inventions in research from
infringement liability”).
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“[a]cademics working in different basic science areas” have been “the
primary beneficiaries of this defense.146
3. Remedial Flexibility in Patent
To be sure, the RDOE and the experimental use defenses are narrow.147
And given the “all-or-nothing” nature of these patent defenses, courts may
be wary of applying them. That is, should a defendant successfully assert
one of these defenses, she is excused from liability and the patent owner
gets nothing.148 Increasingly, courts evaluate the beneficial nature of the
defendant’s use in the context of assessing remedies, rather than liability
determinations—a trend that can be traced to the Supreme Court’s 2006
eBay v. MercExchange decision.
Historically, patent rights have been protected by a “property rule,”149
with courts awarding injunctive relief to the patent owner as a matter of
course in patent infringement actions. But in eBay, the Supreme Court
rejected an automatic injunction rule in patent cases, opting instead for the
four-part analysis that guides courts’ injunction decisions in a wide variety
of cases.150 Injunctive relief is still largely the norm in patent infringement
cases, but a notable concurrence by Justice Kennedy (and joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer) has prompted district courts to consider the
beneficial nature of a defendant’s use in certain contexts.151
146. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual Property Defenses, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 1483, 1500–01 (2013).
147. The narrowness of these ex post doctrines has prompted some scholars to argue for a
broader, fair use–type defense in patent law. See O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1208;
Strandburg, supra note 131.
148. See Lee, supra note 96, at 239.
149. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105 (1972). A property
rule gives the property owner a veto over nonconsensual transfers; potential takers must get
the owner’s consent and pay the owner’s price. A liability rule, by contrast, merely
compensates the right holder for the violation; the owner has no veto power, and the nonholder can take the entitlement in exchange for a court-determined price.
150. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). In this case, eBay
and its subsidiary Half.com infringed MercExchange’s business method patent on an
electronic market. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of permanent
injunctive relief for the patentee, applying its “general rule that courts will issue permanent
injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.” Id. The Supreme
Court reversed the Federal Circuit, clarifying that even if patents are indeed property, “the
creation of a [property] right is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that
right.” Id. at 392. A plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law,
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy
in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction.
Id. at 391.
151. The case also included a concurrence authored by Chief Justice Roberts and joined
by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, which suggested that given the “long tradition of equity
practice” in patent infringement cases, and the “difficulty of protecting a right to exclude
through monetary remedies,” injunctive relief should predominate as the preferred remedy
for patent infringement. Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
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First, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence suggested the sufficiency of
damages in one kind of cumulative innovation context: “[w]hen the
patented invention is but a small component of the [defendant’s]
product.”152 In such cases, where “the threat of an injunction is employed
simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be
sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not
serve the public interest.”153 District court decisions post-eBay suggest that
consideration of certain kinds of beneficial use and improvement by the
defendant will play a bigger role in the remedies analysis than has
historically been the case.154
Second, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence suggests that injunctive relief
should be rejected where a non-practicing patent assertion entity (e.g., a
“patent troll”) seeks to enforce a patent against a defendant that is practicing
the patent (e.g., creating and selling a product that incorporates the patented
technology). “Patent trolls” are firms that “use patents not as a basis for
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing
fees.”155
This distinction is not a consideration of technological
improvement but rather commercial improvement. Namely, the infringing
defendant is practicing the patent and commercializing a product, while the
plaintiff is not. Empirical evidence suggests that, after eBay, district courts
are less likely to grant injunctive relief in cases where the patent holder is a
patent troll.156
B. Cumulative Innovation, the First Amendment,
and Limiting Doctrines in Copyright
While patent infringement analysis asks whether a defendant’s product
falls within the claim language, copyright infringement analysis asks
whether the defendant’s work (1) derives from (i.e., copies) the copyrighted
work and (2) is “substantially similar” to protected expression in the
152. Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 396–97.
154. See, e.g., z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
In z4, the court denied permanent injunctive relief to the owner of patented software
activation technology against the manufacturer of infringing software products that
contained the patented technology, explaining:
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy instructed courts to be cognizant of the
nature of the patent being enforced . . . . Here, product activation is a very small
component of the Microsoft Windows and Office software products that the jury
found to infringe z4’s patents. The infringing product activation component of the
software is in no way related to the core functionality for which the software is
purchased by consumers. Accordingly, Justice Kennedy’s comments support the
conclusion that monetary damages would be sufficient to compensate z4 for any
future infringement by Microsoft.
Id. at 441 (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 395–97).
155. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396.
156. John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2113
(2007); see also Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules
Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 800 (2007) (arguing that “courts should cast a
skeptical eye at claims for injunctive relief where the patent owner is not a direct competitor
of the defendant”).
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copyrighted work.157 The requirement of copying means that copyright law
excuses independent creators from liability—a feature it shares with trade
secret and a notable difference from patent law.158
In the easiest copyright infringement case, the defendant copies verbatim
the plaintiff’s entire work. But infringement is not limited to such cases. It
is possible to infringe a copyright by copying a mere portion of the work,
like a few seconds of a song or a chapter from a novel, or even nonliteral
aspects of the protected work, such as the plot outline or fictional characters
in a movie.159
One important scope-limiting doctrine in copyright is that protection
extends only to the author’s original expression of a work, not to the
underlying ideas, facts, or functional elements of a work.160 This limitation
acts to “draw the line between copyright and patent, as well as between
copyright and the public domain.”161 It is, however, notoriously difficult to
apply in practice. The Copyright Act also designates some specific subjectmatter exemptions, immunizing from liability the public performance or
display of work in the course of “face-to-face teaching activities,” religious
services, and transmission to the blind, among other exemptions.162
Finally, defendants can raise the affirmative defense of fair use, an
equitable defense that excuses infringement. Oft described as the “most
troublesome [doctrine] in the whole law of copyright,”163 fair use is
undoubtedly the “most important—and amorphous—limitation on the
otherwise extraordinarily broad rights granted to copyright owners.”164 Fair
use is “perhaps the most crucial policy tool for maintaining copyright’s
intended balance.”165
1. Fair Use
The fair use doctrine permits courts to gauge the merits of a defendant’s
otherwise infringing use in the context of liability determinations. If a use
157. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
158. Copying can be demonstrated by circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s access
to the work and similarity between the two works. Because copyright infringement requires
copying, independent development of a work is a complete defense—though unintentional or
subconscious copying is not. See, e.g., Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd.,
420 F. Supp. 177, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding that George Harrison’s unintentional
copying of “He’s So Fine” in his composition “My Sweet Lord” was infringement).
159. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 499; Mark A. Lemley, What’s Different About
Intellectual Property, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1116 (2005).
160. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
161. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1187; see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104–05
(1879) (explaining the distinction between a book that can be protected by copyright versus a
system—in this case, for a bookkeeping method—that could only be protected, if at all, by
patent law).
162. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(1), (4), (8).
163. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984)
(quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)).
164. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 551, 551 (2008).
165. Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV.
1483, 1495 (2007).
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is deemed fair, then the defendant need not compensate the copyright
owner.
Congress codified the doctrine in 1976 but did not precisely define “fair
use.” Instead, the preamble to section 107 of the Copyright Act describes
various examples of fair use, including use of the copyrighted work “for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.”166 But there
are no presumptive categories of fair use. In any case where fair use is
asserted, courts must consider the following four nonexclusive factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.167

The last “market harm” factor includes not just actual market harm caused
by the particular infringement but also the potential for lost sales of the
original work if the challenged use becomes widespread and the potential
adverse impact on licensing fees and markets for derivative works (e.g.,
adaptations of the original).168
The Supreme Court has also explained that “transformative uses” of the
copyrighted work—i.e., those that “add[] something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message”—are particularly favored under the first factor and,
relatedly, are presumed to cause less market harm under the fourth
factor.169 The Court identified certain critical uses like parody as “ha[ving]
an obvious claim to transformative value . . . [as] it can provide [a] social
benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a
new one.”170 In setting forth this doctrine, the Court explained:
Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding
of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works
166. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
167. Id.
168. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566–67 (1985). A
“derivative work” is defined in the Copyright Act to include any form in which a work may
be “recast, transformed, or adapted,” including translations, dramatizations, motion picture
versions, abridgements, and the like. 17 U.S.C. § 101. A few decades ago, the Supreme
Court deemed factor four “the single most important element of fair use,” and suggested that
“[f]air use, when properly applied, is limited to copying by others which does not materially
impair the marketability” of the copied work. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566–67. The
importance of this factor has diminished with the Supreme Court’s articulation of the
“transformative use” doctrine. See infra notes 169–73 and accompanying text.
169. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). In Campbell, the
Court considered whether 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s song, “Oh Pretty
Woman,” was a fair use. In concluding that the Court of Appeals erred in deeming 2 Live
Crew’s parodic use presumptively unfair, the Supreme Court laid out the standard for
“transformative use.”
170. Id.
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thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space
within the confines of copyright, and the more transformative the new
work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.171

The transformative use inquiry has become an important aspect of fair use
analysis. In those cases where the defendant’s otherwise infringing use was
deemed transformative, “it exerted nearly dispositive force not simply on
the outcome of factor one but on the overall outcome of the fair use test.”172
The fair use doctrine serves dual purposes: it is an “important safety
valve[]” both for “promoting cumulative creativity and free expression.”173
As the Supreme Court has observed, the “latitude for scholarship and
comment traditionally afforded by fair use” helps reconcile the Copyright
Act with the First Amendment.174 Also, fair use (and in particular, the
focus on “transformative use”) has been justified as a way to avoid market
failure that would otherwise prevent socially desirable uses of the protected
work.175 For example, copyright owners have noneconomic reasons to
prohibit certain transformative uses, especially parodic or critical uses—and
may be unwilling to license their works for such uses, at any price. At the
same time, such uses have positive externalities that the transformative user
cannot capture, making her unwilling to pay for a license.176

171. Id. (internal citations omitted).
172. Beebe, supra note 164, at 605.
173. MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 609.
174. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); see also
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (describing fair use doctrine and the
idea/expression distinction as “copyright’s built-in free speech safeguards”); A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (“[F]ree speech concerns are
‘protected by and coextensive with the fair use doctrine.’” (quoting Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1999))). However, some scholars
have argued that copyright law is fundamentally at odds with the First Amendment, despite
the existence of a fair use defense. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination:
Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002).
175. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600,
1614 (1982) (“Fair use should be awarded to the defendant in a copyright infringement
action when (1) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to the defendant is socially
desirable; and (3) an award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of
the plaintiff copyright owner.”); cf. Tushnet, supra note 65, at 557, 560 (observing that “the
scope of fair use is shrinking because courts and commentators have adopted the idea that
fair use is only relevant for instances of market failure”; while this is “good news for cultural
critics, . . . it makes many traditionally fair uses, such as pure copying carried out for
teaching and research purposes, look unfair”).
176. See Gordon, supra note 175, at 1632–35. This is one kind of market failure. Other
kinds of market failure include cases where high transaction costs stand in the way of private
bargaining. For example, in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the
Supreme Court declined to enjoin Sony from selling VCRs to consumers, who could record
unauthorized copies of copyrighted broadcasts; the Court held the copying to be fair use. 464
U.S. 417, 456 (1984). As commentators have observed, “[t]hat consumers would face
insurmountable transaction costs in identifying, contacting and contracting with the
individual copyright owners for permission to tape helps to account for the holding.”
O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1189.
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The claim for fair use thus seems to be strongest when “a copyright
owner upset by a critical message attempts to suppress it.”177 An example
of such a use is Alice Randall’s retelling of Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With
the Wind from the perspective of a black character, as a critique of racism
and the “myth of white Southern gentility” in the original.178 Not only do
such uses implicate market failure concerns, they are “analogous to the
speech of political protesters attacking received wisdom, whose actions are
generally thought to be at the heart of the First Amendment’s
However, increasingly, fair use encompasses
protections.”179
transformative, noncritical uses that provide widespread educational and
informational benefits—as demonstrated by the recent Google Books
case,180 and other cases involving searchable databases that incorporate
images of copyrighted works.181
2. Remedial Flexibility in Copyright
Like patent defenses, the fair use defense is all-or-nothing in nature. That
is, if courts apply it, the copyright owner gets no remedy at all—an outcome
that some courts and commentators have criticized.182 If a court decides
fair use does not apply, then a copyright owner will often get an injunction
and damages.183 “Rejecting a claim of fair use thus gives the copyright
owner both the right to compensation for the defendant’s use and the right
to prevent or control the circumstances of that use,” through injunctive
relief.184
In patent law, some notable shifts in the remedial landscape have taken
place post-eBay, as discussed above. The impact of eBay on the
development of copyright remedy determinations, however, is less clear.185
177. Tushnet, supra note 65, at 549.
178. Id. at 551; see Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1269–71
(11th Cir. 2001).
179. Tushnet, supra note 65, at 549.
180. See generally Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
181. For example, a district court recently deemed Google’s scanning of twenty million
books into a search index a fair use, due largely to its educational and informational value.
See id. at 293 (noting Google Books’ “significant public benefits” as a “research tool” for
students, teachers, librarians, and scholars, as well as its ability to “preserve[] books, in
particular out-of-print and old books that have been forgotten” and to “facilitate[] access to
books for print-disabled and remote or underserved populations”).
182. See Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 513, 525–27 (1999) (arguing that fair use should be rejected, along with
injunctive relief, and copyright owners should only be entitled to actual damages); see also
Orit Fischman Afori, Flexible Remedies As a Means to Counteract Failures in Copyright
Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 3 (2011) (arguing that courts should change their “allor-nothing” approach to copyright remedies and make the range of remedies more flexible).
183. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 504 (2012) (providing for injunctive relief, as well as
damages equal to “the copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional profits of the
infringer” or “statutory damages”).
184. Lemley & Weiser, supra note 156, at 791.
185. See, e.g., Jiarui Liu, Copyright Injunctions After eBay: An Empirical Study, 16
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 215, 218 (2012) (“An empirical study of all post-eBay copyright
injunction decisions up to June 1, 2010 indicates that the majority of post-eBay decisions on
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Even prior to eBay, however, the Supreme Court has suggested the potential
flexibility of copyright remedies in certain beneficial use contexts—i.e.,
cases where the social benefits associated with an infringing use may not
merit excuse from liability but would nonetheless justify a court’s refusal to
grant injunctive relief.186 And, to some degree, copyright law already relies
on liability rules by imposing compulsory licenses for certain categories of
uses, like non-commercial broadcasting.187
C. Cumulative Innovation, the First Amendment,
and Trade Secret’s Relatively Limited Limiting Doctrines
Once a plaintiff demonstrates she has a trade secret (i.e., information of
value that is not generally known or readily ascertainable, and is the subject
of reasonable secrecy precautions), for liability to attach she must also
prove the defendant “misappropriated” it. Acquisition, use, or disclosure of
the trade secret is misappropriation only where it involves “improper
means” or a breach of confidence.188

copyright injunction still totally ignored the eBay decision as well as the four-factor test
advocated therein.”). But see Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 2010) (“We hold
today that eBay applies with equal force (a) to preliminary injunctions (b) that are issued for
alleged copyright infringement.”).
186. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). In Tasini, freelance writers who
had written articles for the New York Times sought to enjoin the newspaper’s unauthorized
republication in electronic databases. Id. at 457. The Court found infringement, but was
nonetheless sympathetic to the defendants’ arguments that electronic databases provided a
valuable service by providing easy access to newspaper texts going back several decades. Id.
at 505–06. The Court encouraged the trial court to alter the traditional remedy of injunctive
relief and fashion a solution—like instructing parties to arrive at an ongoing royalty
agreement—that would allow the public to benefit from a more complete electronic
database. Id. Notably, the Court observed: “[I]t hardly follows from today’s decision that an
injunction against the inclusion of these Articles in the Databases (much less all freelance
articles in any databases) must issue.” Id. at 505; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (noting in dicta that the “goals of the copyright law . . .
are not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief”).
187. 17 U.S.C. § 118 (2012); see also id. §§ 111(d) (cable television), 114(d) (certain
digital audio transmissions), 115 (phonorecords of nondramatic musical works), 119 (certain
satellite retransmissions). Compulsory licenses give copyright owners the right to
compensation for use, but not injunctive relief; thus, they cannot refuse consent for such
uses.
188. The UTSA § 1 defines “misappropriation” as:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to
know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied
consent by a person who (A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the
trade secret; or (B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know
that his knowledge of the trade secret was (I) derived from or through a person
who has utilized improper means to acquire it; (II) acquired under circumstances
giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (III) derived from or
through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its
secrecy or limit its use; or (C) before a material change of his position, knew or
had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been
acquired by accident or mistake.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990).
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“Improper means” have been found in various situations, including theft,
fraudulent misrepresentations to induce disclosure, tapping of telephone
wires, eavesdropping, or other forms of espionage.189 But there is no
“complete catalogue” of improper means. The term is fairly broad and does
not require an act to be independently actionable.190 Absent improper
means, a defendant’s use or disclosure of the trade secret may be wrongful
because it violates an implied duty (e.g., an employee’s implied duty not to
disclose the employer’s secrets) or explicitly violates a nondisclosure
contract. Cases involving departing employees make up the bulk of trade
secret litigation.191
Because trade secret law protects against breaches of express or implied
duties of confidentiality, trade secret law overlaps to some degree with
contract law principles.192 However, trade secret law departs from contract
law in significant ways. Notably, trade secret liability can extend to
strangers not in privity with the plaintiff, including improper-acquirers,
accidental-acquirers,193 and those who knowingly or negligently obtain
information from one in privity with the plaintiff.194
To the extent that the defendant’s alleged use of the information does not
result in an identical product or process, courts employ the “substantial
derivation” doctrine to assess whether the defendant has misappropriated
the plaintiff’s trade secret—or whether “the contribution of the claimed
trade secret to the [defendant’s] end result is relatively trivial, such that the
defendant can be said to have acted independently.”195 In some ways,
substantial derivation analysis attempts to do what copyright infringement
analysis does—i.e., assess whether the defendant, in fact, improperly relied
upon plaintiff’s work. Unlike copyright infringement analysis, however,
courts’ substantial derivation analysis lacks clarity and uniformity. Some
courts, in assessing whether the defendant’s use substantially derived from
the plaintiff’s information, “have used as analogy the patent law’s ‘doctrine
of equivalents,’ focusing on whether the defendant’s process seeks to
189. Id. § 1(1), 14 U.L.A. 437.
190. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmt. f, at 10 (1939)). Here, the Fifth Circuit
held that the defendants misappropriated trade secrets when they engaged in the fully legal
act of taking aerial photographs of the plaintiff’s engineering plant while it was under
construction. In that case, the court explained that “‘improper’ will always be a word of
many nuances, determined by time, place, and circumstances.” Id. at 1017.
191. See generally MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 85–89; Lemley, supra note 71, at
318.
192. Some commentators have suggested that trade secret law is (or should be)
coextensive with contract. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
193. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii)(C), 14 U.L.A. 437.
194. Id. § 1(2)(ii)(B), 14 U.L.A. 437. Thus, if an employee leaves employer A, then takes
a trade secret to employer B, B can be held liable for using the trade secret despite B’s lack
of privity with A, so long as B knew or should have known that the employee had a duty of
confidentiality to A.
195. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 6.03[4], at 6-35; see also Penalty Kick Mgmt. Ltd. v. Coca
Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003) (granting summary judgment for the
defendant where the “defendant independently created the allegedly misappropriated item
with only ‘slight contribution from the plaintiff’s trade secret’”).
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achieve the same result by performing substantially the same function in
substantially the same way as does [the] plaintiff’s.”196 Other courts seem
to employ the “substantial similarity” analysis of copyright law.197 Still
other courts employ a more relaxed and vague standard of mere
“similarity.”198
The ad-hoc nature of substantial derivation analysis means that the
infringement net can be cast wide—encompassing a defendant’s end
product or process that is quite different from the original. It is sufficient
that the defendant “has exploited the information in some way that either
harms the owner or provides an advantage to the defendant”—for example,
by using the trade secret information as a “starting point” to “assist or
accelerate research.”199 And the “defendant cannot avoid liability by
showing that it has created a modified or improved product or process, if
there was any substantial derivation from the plaintiff’s information.”200
1. Reverse Engineering
Trade secrecy “defenses” (to the extent they can be labeled as such) tend
to blur into an element of a trade secret claim.201 One “defense” is prior
publication of the secret. If, for example, the alleged trade secret was
published in a patent or in a trade journal before the defendant got her hands
on it, the information is not “secret” and thus falls outside the scope of
protectable subject matter.202 Other defenses focus on the defendant’s
method of acquisition—i.e., proper, as opposed to improper, ways of
obtaining secret information. For example, similar to copyright, if the
defendant independently discovered the secret, she is not liable. The most
significant trade secret defense, however, is reverse engineering of a
product to discover how it works.
Reverse engineering has long been a permissible way to obtain a trade
secret, provided that the “acquisition . . . [is] by fair and honest means, such
as purchase of the item on the open market.”203 The Supreme Court in

196. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 6.03[4], at 6-33.
197. Id.
198. Id.; see also Stomback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 305–06 (6th Cir. 2004);
Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 329 (7th Cir. 1984); Motorola, Inc. v. Computer
Displays Int’l, Inc., 739 F.2d 1149, 1157 (7th Cir. 1984).
199. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 6.03[4], at 6-33; see also N. Petrochemical Co. v.
Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057, 1059 n.2. (7th Cir. 1973) (“[T]he evidence is clear that [the
plaintiff’s process] served as the cornerstone for any modified process which [defendant]
intends to use.”).
200. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 6.03[4], at 6-33; see also Mangren Research & Dev. Co. v.
Nat’l Chem. Co., 87 F.3d 937, 944 (7th Cir. 1996).
201. MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 76 (classifying “proper means” as “defenses”
because “they do not directly deny the existence of a trade secret or the defendant’s use of
the secret”).
202. Generally, publication (e.g., in an academic journal or in a patent) destroys the
secret. Thus, an inventor must usually “elect” either patent or trade secret protection. See,
e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Agro v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 272 F.3d 1335, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
203. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 2 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437, 438 (1990).
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Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,204 described reverse
engineering as “an essential part of innovation” that “may lead to
significant advances in the field.”205 And absent a reverse engineering
exception, trade secret law could “undermine federal patent policy because
it would ‘convert the . . . trade secret into a state-conferred monopoly akin
to the absolute protection that a federal patent affords.’”206 The reverse
engineering defense is an important limitation on the rights of trade secret
owners—and one that is concerned with the cumulative nature of
innovation. Despite scholarly suggestions that it plays a similar role to
copyright fair use,207 however, the defense is not applicable in a number of
cumulative innovation and First Amendment–related contexts (as illustrated
in Part III).
2. Defenses Relevant to First Amendment/Public Interest Concerns
In the copyright context, fair use doctrine plays a pivotal role in
reconciling copyright law with the First Amendment and addressing
cumulative creation concerns. In trade secret law, reverse engineering
speaks to the latter. But it is underinclusive—that is, the reverse
engineering defense does not consider the social benefits of a defendant’s
use or disclosure if the information was acquired in any way other than
reverse engineering. Nor does the reverse engineering defense reconcile
trade secret law with the First Amendment—for example, where
unauthorized disclosures of protected information are made for the purpose
of educating the public about health and safety concerns.
Trade secret law is not entirely silent on the issue of balancing rights of
trade secret owners against the public’s interest in disclosure. For example,
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition notes: “[T]he disclosure of
another’s trade secret for [a purpose] other than commercial exploitation
may implicate the interest in freedom of expression or advance another
significant public interest.”208 The Restatement further observes: “A
privilege is likely to be recognized, for example, in connection with the
disclosure of information that is relevant to public health or safety, or to the
commission of a crime or tort, or to other matters of substantial public
concern.”209 Despite this comment in the Restatement, however, courts
204. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
205. Id. at 160 (noting that “the competitive reality of reverse engineering may act as a
spur to the inventor” to develop ideas that are patentable); see also Samuelson & Scotchmer,
supra note 11, at 1582–90 (describing justifications for the right to reverse engineer).
206. Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 11, at 1584 (quoting Chi. Lock Co. v. Fanberg,
676 F.2d 400, 405 (9th Cir. 1981)).
207. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 61; Samuelson, supra note 118, at 788 (suggesting that
trade secret defenses and the requirement of defendant misappropriation perform similar
functions as limiting doctrines of copyright law, but noting that “[a]s trade secret rights in
information get stronger, tensions between trade secret law and the First Amendment are
likely to increase”).
208. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1995).
209. Id. In relevant part, comment c notes:
The scope of liability at common law and under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act for
disclosures that do not involve commercial exploitation of the secret information is
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rarely invoke it to excuse unauthorized disclosures of trade secrets for
public interest purposes.210 Since most states have adopted the UTSA as
statutory law, the Restatement has had little impact on the development of
trade secret law and “is frequently disregarded.”211 The UTSA does not
incorporate a First Amendment or public interest privilege.
On the rare occasions when First Amendment interests are explicitly
considered by courts, it is usually in the context of preliminary injunction
decisions as part of a prior restraint analysis.212 But even these prior
restraint cases demonstrate confusion and inconsistency as to the level of
“public concern” that must be implicated, the relevance of the discloser’s
purpose, and whether the defendant must be an established news
The general
organization to trigger First Amendment scrutiny.213
reluctance of courts to consider speech concerns in trade secret cases is
perhaps attributable to a perception that trade secrets are property or
“commercial” speech, and thus less relevant to First Amendment

unclear. . . . [T]he disclosure of another’s trade secret for purposes other than
commercial exploitation may implicate the interest in freedom of expression or
advance another significant public interest. A witness who is compelled by law to
disclose another’s trade secret during the course of a judicial proceeding, for
example, is not subject to liability. The existence of a privilege to disclose
another’s trade secret depends upon the circumstances of the particular case,
including the nature of the information, the purpose of the disclosure, and the
means by which the actor acquired the information. A privilege is likely to be
recognized, for example, in connection with the disclosure of information that is
relevant to public health or safety, or to the commission of a crime or tort, or to
other matters of substantial public concern.
Id. Some whistle-blowing statutes also excuse employee disclosures of trade secret–
protected information in connection with exposing a violation of state or federal law. See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012) (prohibiting employer retaliation against employees who
provide information about fraud against shareholders by publicly traded companies); see
also 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (2012) (prohibiting employer retaliation against employees who
disclose information “reasonably believe[d]” to be a violation of law or “a substantial and
specific danger to public health or safety,” so long as “such disclosure is not specifically
prohibited by law”; however, the latter condition is presumably violated when disclosure is
prohibited by trade secret law).
210. A Westlaw search of federal and state cases invoking the “public interest” language
of this Restatement comment resulted in a single case: Merckle GmbH v. Johnson &
Johnson, 961 F. Supp. 721, 735 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding that a competitor’s alleged use of a
drug manufacturer’s trade secrets for the purpose of litigating patent infringement claims
against the manufacturer in Germany did not further a substantial public interest and was not
privileged).
211. See Seaman, supra note 28, at 14.
212. Preliminary injunctions (not permanent injunctions) that restrain speech are
generally deemed unconstitutional “prior restraints.” See generally Martin H. Redish, The
Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53
(1984). The concern underlying the prior restraint doctrine is that preliminary injunctions
suppress lawful speech “before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First
Amendment.” Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 390 (1973). By contrast, permanent injunctions restraining speech are generally viewed
as constitutional because they follow a court’s final determination that speech is unprotected.
213. See, e.g., CBS Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317 (1994); DVD Copy Control
Assoc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 15–17 (Cal. 2003); see also infra note 274 and accompanying
text.
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interests.214 Or perhaps the lack of an explicit framework for analysis (akin
to copyright’s multifactor test) makes courts wary of excusing trade secret
defendants from liability for First Amendment/public interest reasons,
because there is no shared understanding of when such an exception should
apply.
3. Remedial Flexibility in Trade Secret
Like patent and copyright, injunctive relief is the primary form of relief
for trade secret misappropriation.215 In addition to injunctive relief, trade
secret remedies also include damages measured by either the plaintiff’s loss
or the defendant’s profits attributable to the trade secret (or both).216 In
certain contexts, trade secret misappropriation is even subject to criminal
sanction.217
In civil trade secret cases, the factual issue most pertinent to the remedies
decision is whether the secret information has been publicly disclosed.
Where the defendant has already publicly disclosed the information “so that
its value is destroyed,” the plaintiff’s remedy is for money damages.218 But
where the defendant seeks to keep using a trade secret that has not been
publicly disclosed or where disclosure is threatened, injunctive relief is
usually awarded as a matter of course.219 Because trade secret disputes
often arise between competitors, and neither wants to destroy the secret’s

214. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
562–63 (1980) (explaining that commercial speech is entitled to less protection than other
kinds of speech, such as political speech). Some scholars have argued that trade secrets are
best characterized as “property” and, thus, should be immune from First Amendment
scrutiny altogether. See, e.g., Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 99, at 5.; Richard A. Epstein,
Privacy, Publication and the First Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment
Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1037 (2000).
215. See William Lynch Schaller, Secrets of the Trade:
Tactical and Legal
Considerations from the Trade Secret Plaintiff’s Perspective, 29 REV. LITIG. 729, 807 (2010)
(noting that “[i]njunctive relief is the normal and primary remedy granted in trade secret
cases, for the obvious reason that a secret once lost is forever lost”); see also FMC Corp. v.
Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (holding that
loss of trade secret status cannot be remedied by money damages, as a secret once lost is
“lost forever”). Unlike copyright, trade secret does not have compulsory licensing
categories. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
216. See Lemley, supra note 71, at 319.
217. In 1996, Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), which for the first
time imposed federal criminal penalties for intentional and knowing theft or unlawful
disclosure of trade secrets. Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012)). The EEA criminalizes “two types of trade secret theft:
(1) espionage on behalf of a foreign entity, and (2) theft of trade secrets for pecuniary gain.”
Seaman, supra note 28, at 17. However, the EEA “has not been widely used by federal
prosecutors.” Id. at 18.
218. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 7.01, at 7-2 to -3.
219. Id. § 7.02[2], at 7-7 (noting that injunctive relief is often the preferred remedy
“[b]ecause exclusivity is the hallmark of value, and because damages are difficult to identify
and measure”). Under the UTSA, a reasonable royalty is permitted instead of an injunction
only in “exceptional circumstances.” UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(b) (amended 1985), 14
U.L.A. 437, 449 (1990).
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value by publishing it, injunctive relief is “the most sought after, and most
important, remedy in trade secret misappropriation cases.”220
A trade secret injunction can sweep quite broadly. Depending on the
circumstances, the injunction may curb not only the use of the secret by the
defendant but also the manufacture of a product that encompasses the
secret—where, for example, the acquired secrets may have become
“inextricably connected” with the defendant’s process.221 If the secret was
used for producing component parts, the court might restrain the defendant
from making the entire product or even similar products.222
As discussed in the previous sections, eBay’s impact on patent (and to a
lesser extent, copyright) cases has been to make the remedies analysis more
searching. Rather than presuming irreparable harm upon a showing of
patent infringement, courts assess the potential value of the defendant’s
unauthorized use relative to the harm caused to the plaintiff, as well as the
public interest.223 The impact of eBay on trade secret cases is more
dubious.224 This is particularly so given that trade secret cases are often
litigated in state, rather than federal, courts.225
The Second Circuit’s approach, which applies increased scrutiny for
injunctive relief in trade secret cases, seems unusual in this regard. In
Faiveley Transport Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp.,226 the plaintiff sought
injunctive relief against the defendant for its use of “know-how” relating to
subway train brakes.227 The Second Circuit explained that a presumption of
irreparable harm was inappropriate in cases where the defendant is likely to
use the trade secret for her own profit motives rather than disseminate it. In

220. David S. Levine, The Impact of Trade Secrecy on Public Transparency, in TRADE
SECRECY, supra note 21, at 406, 439.
221. See, e.g., Gen. Electric Co. v. Sung, 843 F. Supp. 776, 780 (D. Mass. 1994); ILG
Indus. Inc. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393, 396–97 (Ill. 1971).
222. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 7.02[2], at 7-30.
223. See supra Part II.A.3.
224. See, e.g., E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 691,
706–07 (E.D. Va. 2012) (applying Virginia’s equity principles, which presume irreparable
harm when the trade secret statute is violated, instead of the four-factor standard for
injunctive relief announced in eBay); see also Seaman, supra note 28, at 60–61 (contrasting
the relative difficulty of obtaining injunctive relief in the patent context against the trade
secret context).
225. In federal cases, the law of the forum state applies with respect to substantive issues
(e.g., definition of a trade secret misappropriation and damages), but as to procedural issues,
including the standards for issuing injunctions, federal law applies. POOLEY, supra note 4,
§ 7.02[2], at 7-10 n.22 (citing Ferrero v. Associated Materials Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1448
(11th Cir. 1991)). But see E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 894 F. Supp. 2d at 707 (choosing
to apply Virginia’s standard for issuing injunctions).
226. 559 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2009).
227. See id. at 114. These subway train brakes are known as “Brake Friction Cylinder
Tread Break Units” (BFC TBU)—known to the rest of us as “that loud squeaking, sparking
braking system that so reliably stops the New York City Transit subway system.” Id. at 113.
The plaintiff Faiveley sued the defendant, who following the termination of a licensing
agreement to use the technology, began to develop its own line of BFC TBU. Id. at 114.
Faiveley sought preliminary injunctive relief to prevent the defendant “from manufacturing
or marketing BFC TBU or disclosing to third parties any trade secrets associated with BFC
TBU,” which the district court granted. Id. at 115.
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such cases, the “misappropriator will often have the same incentive as the
originator to maintain the confidentiality of the secret in order to profit from
the proprietary knowledge,” and thus, monetary damages are adequate to
make the plaintiff whole.228
III. ACCOUNTING FOR THE DIFFERENCES:
ARE EXISTING TRADE SECRET LIMITS SUFFICIENT
TO ADDRESS CUMULATIVE INNOVATION AND SPEECH CONCERNS?
This part highlights a number of real world examples where trade secret
law’s existing limits may prove insufficient to reconcile cumulative
innovation and speech concerns. Such examples include situations where
(1) information claimed as trade secrets has been used for purposes of
significant technological “improvement” (e.g., making a product or process
more efficient, expanding interoperability, or revealing glitches or security
flaws in a product), and (2) information claimed as trade secrets potentially
affects public health, safety, or welfare.
A. “Improvement” Cases
One subset of problematic trade secret cases involves significant
“improvers” of protected information. The trade secret improvement
context presents challenges to efficient licensing and risks of market failure
not unlike its patent and copyright counterparts.229 In fact, the secrecy
aspect of the information may create particular impediments to efficient
licensing—for example, greater uncertainty as to the information’s value
and scope.230
To be sure, defining and gauging “improvement” in the intellectual
property context is a difficult endeavor.231 The breadth of trade secret
subject matter renders unlikely any single definition of improvement or an
exhaustive list of improvement scenarios. But insofar as the subject matter
at issue is of a technical nature, one can look to patent law’s conception of
228. Id. at 119. The court noted: “A rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm might be
warranted in cases where there is a danger that . . . [the defendant] will disseminate those
secrets to wider audience or otherwise irreparably impair the value of those secrets.” Id. at
118.
In Faiveley, such a presumption—and consequently, injunctive relief—was
unwarranted because the defendant was likely to treat the trade secret–protected information
“with the same confidentiality that they give to their own proprietary information.” Id. at
119.
229. See supra notes 130, 176 and accompanying text.
230. Pooley, for example, observes the reluctance of trade secret owners to reveal
information in licensing negotiation. And because the prospective licensee is often
“considering developing its own technology in house,” the licensee is reluctant to expose
employees who are best equipped to assess the licensor’s technology to it for fear that
“exposing them to the secrets of the prospective licensor might taint them and engender
subsequent litigation if the technology ultimately is developed in house.” POOLEY, supra
note 4, § 6.05, at 6-44.
231. See Varadarajan, supra note 10, at 684 (observing that fuzziness of intellectual
property boundaries and the array of protectable subject matter makes consideration of
“improvement” in intellectual property less straightforward than the tangible property law
context).

2014]

TRADE SECRET FAIR USE

1439

cumulative improvement for guidance.232 Specifically, the improvement
scenarios presented below involve the use of trade secret–protected
information to make a product or process more efficient, to expand
interoperability, or to reveal flaws in a product or process.233
For the purpose of illustrating the first of these scenarios, consider the
train brake example posed at the outset of this Article. Suppose Allen, an
employee of Company A, works on developing an improved subway train
brake. In the course of his employment, he learns of negative know-how
relevant to the project. Company A decides to shelve the project, focusing
on more profitable avenues of research and development. Allen leaves to
work for Company B, heading a team that is tasked with developing an
improved subway train brake. Relying on the negative know-how he
obtained from his previous employment, Allen guides his new team away
from research avenues that proved unsuccessful at Company A and
develops a more efficient, better-operating train brake that proves a market
success. If Company A sues Allen and/or Company B for trade secret
misappropriation, Company A would have a successful claim in many
jurisdictions. As for the remedy, Company A would likely be able to secure
an injunction for a limited period of time (a “head start” injunction), which
would prevent Company B from selling their product for a period of time
sufficient to compensate for the misappropriation.234 And, as discussed in
Part II, no clear limiting doctrines in trade secret law require courts to ask
whether Company B’s substantial improvement of the trade secret merits
either excuse from liability or, alternatively, departure from a property rule
in favor of a liability rule (e.g., a reasonable royalty remedy).235
Analogizing this scenario to the patent context, negative know-how
would not be protectable in the first instance under patent law.236 But
suppose it was; or suppose in this hypothetical, it was knowledge of a
successful manufacturing process that Allen had taken with him. Such a
manufacturing process could form the subject of a patent. If Company B’s
improved version of the train brake employed a mechanical process that
infringed Company A’s patented process, then patent limiting doctrines,
like the RDOE or (more likely) the remedies analysis post-eBay, would
provide a vehicle for examining the nature and significance of the

232. In patent law, when courts and commentators refer to improvement or cumulative
innovation, they usually mean one of the following: (1) using the patented component as an
input into producing another invention; (2) finding a new use for a patented invention; or
(3) coming up with a more efficient or better functioning version of an existing invention.
See supra note 123.
233. These examples are meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. Nor should all
improvements falling within these parameters trigger exceptional treatment under trade
secret law. Indeed, the significance of the defendant’s improvement is an important
consideration under the proposed trade secret fair use analysis described in Part IV.
234. See, e.g., Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 142
(9th Cir. 1965) (upholding district court’s “head start” injunction); see also MERGES ET AL.,
supra note 17, at 116.
235. See supra Part II.C.
236. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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improvement.237 But if Company A chose to protect the information under
trade secret law, such improvement-oriented limiting doctrines would not
apply.
Moving from mechanical inventions to the computer software context,
suppose the trade secret defendant uses protected information (not obtained
through reverse engineering) to enhance interoperability of new products
with existing platforms. In some cases, technology providers use
intellectual property (and contract) law to restrict others from learning the
interfaces and protocols required for interoperability.238 Daniel Laster has
observed, for example, that Apple uses various methods to prevent others
from accessing the requisite information to develop products that can
interoperate with its iTunes platform.239 This limits consumers’ choice of
products that can work on preexisting platforms.240
Or consider the former employee who uses knowledge of trade secrets to
conduct testing of a product in order to identify glitches or security
problems that need correcting for consumers’ benefit. This scenario is,
once again, particularly relevant to the software context. As Derek E.
Bambauer and Oliver Day have observed: “[S]ome researchers may switch
sides, working first as an employee or consultant, and then moving to
perform independent testing.”241 In such cases, “the software company
may have a plausible claim that the researcher’s work is influenced by her
knowledge of the firm’s trade secrets.”242 Even nonemployee users may be
similarly restricted from testing software if they are subject to end-user
237. See supra Part II.A.
238. See, e.g., Daniel Laster, The Secret Is Out: Patent Law Preempts Mass Market
License Terms Barring Reverse Engineering for Interoperability Purposes, 58 BAYLOR L.
REV. 621, 642 (2006) (arguing the use of contract law to enforce mass market licenses
barring reverse engineering for interoperability purposes “subverts the fundamental principle
of trade secret law that a competitor is free to [reverse engineer] a product which is publicly
available in the marketplace”; the use of contract law to expand trade secret protections in
this way has turned it into a “nation-wide property right without any of the limitations built
into other IP regimes”).
239. Id. at 622. “Apple has elected to keep the iTunes platform closed . . . and does not
publish the interface specifications needed for a competitor to develop a product to
interoperate with iTunes. It is for this reason that a consumer who wishes to use iTunes must
acquire an iPod, rather than some device of a third party.” Id. at 635.
240. This issue has been further complicated by the enactment of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1988 (DMCA). Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1202 (2012)). The DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions “create[] an
extremely strong form of trade-secret-like protection for technical protection measures, far
beyond that provided by any other law.” Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 11, at 1646.
Ordinarily, an unpatented technical measure would be subject to reverse engineering, but the
DMCA provisions “effectively insulate makers of technical protection measures from
competitive reverse analysis.” Id. Certain exceptions to the DMCA’s anticircumventions
rule do permit reverse engineering to achieve interoperability among programs, but they
have been interpreted quite narrowly. Id.
241. Derek E. Bambauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1077
(2011).
242. Id.; see also id. at 1053, 1077 (describing one notorious example where a former
Cisco employee discovered flaws in Cisco’s internet routers, which endangered “a wide
swath of internet infrastructure”; Cisco argued, plausibly, “that his work was influenced by
exposure to Cisco’s proprietary information”).
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license agreements that forbid reverse engineering.243 These parties use
trade secrets to test software and find security flaws; thus, their goal is not
to develop competitive products but rather “to improve [the software’s]
resilience and robustness.”244
B. First Amendment Interests: Promoting Disclosure of Information
Related to Public Health, Safety, and Welfare Concerns
In addition to cumulative innovation concerns, another set of problematic
cases concerns trade secret law’s role in preventing public access to
confidential information that implicates public health, safety, and welfare.
In various contexts, federal and state governments can require companies to
disclose proprietary information for regulatory purposes—for example,
requiring drug companies to disclose information to the FDA for drug
approval.245 But many of the controversies described below involve trade
secret law’s prohibitive effect on the public’s ability to access information
relevant to health, safety, and welfare. The absence of robust limiting
doctrines in trade secret law affects the public’s ability to access such
information, through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests as well
as employee and third-party disclosures.
1. Scholarly Work Demonstrating Trade Secret Law’s Prohibitive Effect
on Public Access to Relevant Information
Trade secret law is a relatively undertheorized area—especially when
compared to patent or copyright. In recent years, however, a growing
number of scholars have highlighted the increasing tension between trade
secret law and the public’s interest in accessing information pertinent to
health, safety, and welfare—for example, information concerning health
care, the environment, voting machines, and search engine algorithms.246
These examples highlight the extent to which industries depend on “trade
secrecy as a cornerstone of [their] intellectual property scheme[s],”247
sometimes with the goal of consumer and regulatory obfuscation, rather
than protection from competitors. Together, these industry-specific studies
paint a picture of trade secret law that has grown in breadth and influence,
without a concomitant adjustment of doctrinal limits.
In the health care context, for example, Annemarie Bridy has criticized
efforts by medical device manufacturers to guard information regarding
prices paid by hospitals. In criticizing the Guidant Corporation’s use of
243. Id. at 1078. Here, too, as in the interoperability context, the interplay of trade secret
and contract law can be particularly problematic. Software vendors often include language
in end-user license agreements forbidding reverse engineering. Such a contractual obligation
“might be sufficient to make a software user responsible for maintaining the trade secret.” Id.
at 1076.
244. Id. at 1078.
245. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Data Secrecy in the Age of Regulatory Exclusivity,
in TRADE SECRECY, supra note 21, at 467.
246. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
247. Levine, supra note 21, at 641.
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trade secret law to prevent disclosure of certain medical device pricing,
Bridy observes:
The aim of Guidant’s legal efforts has been to prevent device buyers—
usually group purchasing organizations, health systems, or individual
hospitals—from shopping device prices, which they have routinely done
by sharing price-paid information among themselves, hired health care
consultants, and subscription-based benchmarking services . . . which
exist to help hospitals hold down their supply costs. . . . Guidant’s desire
to conceal the prices hospitals pay is thus motivated not by the concern
that competitors will acquire and use the information to their economic
advantage, which is the traditional concern in trade secrets cases, but by
the concern that customers will.248

Bridy argues that such efforts, “if . . . ultimately accepted by courts, could
have profound implications . . . for the health care market, including the
market for pharmaceuticals.”249
Other commentators have described the role of trade secret law in
impeding public efforts to access information regarding harmful effects of
breast implant devices250 or the disclosure of raw data that is submitted to
the FDA by pharmaceutical companies.251 As Rebecca Eisenberg observes:
“Disclosure of data from clinical trials would permit more users to learn
more from it, allowing them to make better informed choices about current
treatments and future research, as well as permitting better public oversight
over regulatory decision-making.”252
In the environmental context, Mary Lyndon has described trade secret
law’s role in restricting public access to the composition and health effects
of discharged chemicals. Various industries, from cosmetics to pesticides
to hydraulic “fracking,” utilize processes that introduce chemicals into the
environment.253 A particularly stark example occurred earlier this year,
when Freedom Industries, a supplier of coal processing compounds, caused
a chemical leak in West Virginia’s Elk River. The leak contaminated
Charleston’s water supply, leaving 300,000 residents without usable water

248. Bridy, supra note 5, at 191.
249. Id. at 192.
250. See Margaret Witherup Tindall, Breast Implant Information As Trade Secrets:
Another Look at FOIA’s Fourth Exemption, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 213, 224 (1993); see also
Anderson v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 939–40 (10th Cir. 1990)
(discussing FOIA request for documents submitted to the FDA by a manufacturer of silicone
breast implants).
251. Eisenberg, supra note 245, at 471. Congress has thus far “stopped short of calling
for disclosure of raw data that are submitted to the FDA.” Id. Eisenberg argues: “[I]t is
difficult to justify the continuing treatment of data submitted in pursuit of regulatory
approval as trade secret or confidential information belonging to the submitter.” Id. at 469.
Recently, Johnson & Johnson announced that it would voluntarily “mak[e] all of its clinical
trial data available to scientists around the world.” See Harlan M. Krumholz, Give the Data
to the People, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2014, at A23.
252. Eisenberg, supra note 245, at 470–71.
253. See Mary L. Lyndon, Trade Secrets and Information Access in Environmental Law,
in TRADE SECRECY, supra note 21, at 442.
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and many seeking medical attention.254 Despite these health effects,
Freedom insisted that the specific make-up of its coal-processing
compounds were protected trade secrets and successfully delayed disclosing
them to the public.255
David Levine has described similar conflicts between trade secret law
and access in the context of voting machines and breathalyzer devices. He
warns that “public access to the internal workings of [voting] machines,”
like those produced by Diebold Election Systems is difficult, “or in some
cases impossible, to obtain.”256 Similarly, in a number of states, criminal
defendants have challenged the validity of breathalyzer tests used to
prosecute them, seeking the machines’ source code to determine their
accuracy.257 Levine warns that in both contexts, “the public’s interest in
transparency is marred by trade secrecy doctrine, providing a very powerful
tool to prevent wide dissemination of basic information about governmental
operations.”258
And in the internet search engine context, Frank Pasquale has described
the role of trade secrets “as undisclosed ‘rules of the game’ in competitions
for prominence in search engine results.”259 Entities such as Google,
Amazon, and eBay provide consumers with valuable filtering services.260
However, these search engines often keep their sorting algorithms
confidential, using trade secret law as the mechanism to do so.261 While
search engines may have valid reasons for keeping their algorithms secret
254. See Paul M. Barrett, A Second Chemical Spilled in West Virginia, and the Company
Said Nothing Until Now, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 23, 2014),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-23/a-second-toxic-chemical-spilled-in-westvirginia-and-freedom-industries-said-nothing-until-now.
255. See Ken Ward Jr., Second Chemical Information “Very Limited,” CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Jan. 22, 2014, at A1 (noting that Freedom delayed disclosing information for
almost two weeks after the spill occurred, when West Virginia’s Department of
Environmental Protection finally issued an order “demanding that Freedom Industries
disclose . . . any and all information fully describing the composition of the materials spilled
into the Elk River”).
256. Levine, supra note 220, at 419. In November 2005, for example, Diebold refused to
comply with a North Carolina law requiring electronic voting machine vendors “to place,
among other items, their software and source code in escrow ‘with an independent escrow
agent approved by the State Board of Elections,’” so the state could test voting systems. Id.
at 419–20 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163–165.9A(a) (2005)). Citing trade secret law,
Diebold sued the North Carolina Board of Elections, seeking a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the statute. Id. at 420. Ultimately, “Diebold chose to withdraw from
competition for business within the state” and “chose to focus on states where trade secrecy
law is completely impermeable to public law overrides.” Id. at 420–21.
257. Id. at 423–25.
258. Id. at 425.
259. Pasquale, supra note 21, at 403.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 395. As Pasquale observes:
[T]he core of Google’s business model is its search engine, and no one outside the
company truly understands how that works. The company prides itself on keeping
its algorithms confidential, and trade secrecy law has helped it defeat or limit even
governmental requests for more data on how it operates.
Id. at 394–95. See generally James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93
IOWA L. REV. 1 (2007).
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(e.g., to prevent tampering with results), many people are affected by their
And
place in the “pecking order that search engines create.”262
problematically, they have no ability to understand or contest search engine
results because the algorithms are protected trade secrets.263
2. Means of Accessing Information: FOIA Requests
and Unauthorized Disclosures by Employees and Third Parties
The expansive definitional breadth of trade secrets, coupled with the lack
of meaningful ex post limits, affects both the public’s ability to access
information that companies have disclosed to the government through
FOIA requests, as well as the likelihood that information will be made
public by employees and third parties.
Government agencies, in keeping with their regulatory function, receive a
great deal of information from businesses, some of which businesses
consider to be trade secrets. Under FOIA, anyone can request copies of
documents from executive branch agencies.264 While FOIA applies only to
the federal government, each state has a similar statute.265 Obviously,
business competitors have an interest in obtaining valuable trade secrets,
and FOIA provides a vehicle to do this. Thus, FOIA contains certain
exemptions against the disclosure of trade secrets.266 Agencies wield
considerable discretion in deciding whether to disclose information
requested under FOIA that the submitter claims is a trade secret.267
A comprehensive analysis of the “intricate patchwork of agency rules and
regulations that govern the treatment of trade-secret information”268 under
FOIA is beyond the scope of this Article. But insofar as agencies (and
reviewing courts) rely on the UTSA and common law in making these
262. Pasquale, supra note 21, at 403.
263. Id. at 403–04; see also Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search
Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 1149, 1151 (2008).
264. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), amended by OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-175, 121 Stat. 2524; see also Elizabeth A. Rowe, Striking a Balance: When Should
Trade-Secret Law Shield Disclosures to the Government?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 791, 804–08
(2011) (noting that the requester need not show “standing, legitimate interest, or any other
threshold requirement to be entitled to the information”).
265. See generally Burt A. Braverman & Wesley R. Heppler, A Practical Review of State
Open Records Laws, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 720 (1981); Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation,
What Constitutes “Trade Secrets” Exempt from Disclosure Under State Freedom of
Information Act, 27 A.L.R. 4th 773 (1984).
266. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)–(4). Subsection 3 exempts from disclosure information that is
“specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.” Id. § 552(b)(3). Subsection 4 exempts
from disclosure “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential.” Id. § 552(b)(4). Thus, subsection 4 is the more
expansive of the two, encompassing not only trade secrets but also “commercial or financial
information” that are “privileged or confidential.” See Rowe, supra note 264, at 805 (noting
that these exemptions are “permissive, not mandatory”).
267. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). Courts review agency determinations under the deferential
“arbitrary and capricious” standard. Id. § 706(2)(A); see, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281, 318 (1979); Reliance Electric Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 924 F.2d
274, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
268. Rowe, supra note 264, at 798.
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disclosure determinations, the absence of meaningful ex post limits in trade
secret law adversely affects requesters’ ability to access information
relevant to public health, safety, and welfare.269 And as commentators have
observed, agencies are too deferential to a submitter’s own characterization
of the information as a trade secret.270 For example, “if the FDA is
uncertain about whether the material is in fact protected, the FDA will
consult with the trade-secret owner to determine if the material should be
disclosed.”271
In addition, employees or third-party receivers seeking to disclose
information relevant to public health, safety, and welfare may find
themselves at odds with trade secret law. For example, suppose a former
tobacco industry executive who has signed a confidentiality agreement with
his previous employer “reveal[s] in an Internet blog information about trade
secret-protected studies conducted by his prior firm that showed harmful
health impacts of smoking.”272
While some state and federal
“whistleblower” statutes have been enacted to privilege certain employee
disclosures that would otherwise be considered trade secret violations, they
are limited in application.273 And in general, courts have been more
hospitable to disclosures by third-party receivers of trade secrets,
particularly established news organizations, than to disclosures by
employees.274
IV. TOWARD A DOCTRINE OF TRADE SECRET FAIR USE
Limiting doctrines play an integral role in intellectual property law.
While trade secret law increasingly bears the moniker of intellectual
property, it lacks sufficient limits to address cumulative innovation and
First Amendment concerns. As the previous sections illustrate, trade secret
law’s relative indifference to the social benefits of unauthorized use stands
in contrast to copyright and, to a lesser extent, patent law.
269. The Department of Justice provides a FOIA guide to help determine when
information is a trade secret. United States Department of Justice Guide to the Freedom of
Information Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/doj-guidefreedom-information-act-0.
270. See, e.g., Lyndon, supra note 21, at 503–04; Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A.
Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information: Reforming
Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837, 838 (1980).
271. Rowe, supra note 264, at 808 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 20.20 (2010)).
272. Samuelson, supra note 118, at 819.
273. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
274. Samuelson, supra note 118 at 820; see, e.g., CBS Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318
(1994) (denying injunction to meatpacking company that sued to prevent CBS’s telecast of
videotape footage taken at the company’s factory that exposed unsanitary practices); Ford
Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (denying Ford’s motion for
preliminary injunction against internet blogger’s disclosure of trade secret–protected
information related to Ford’s strategies for fuel economy and vehicle emissions); see also
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii)(B) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990) (imposing
liability on two kinds of defendants: direct misappropriators of secret information—e.g.,
employees and those who use improper means to obtain information—and third party
receivers of such information who knew or should have known the information was
wrongfully obtained—e.g., knowing or negligent receivers of trade secrets).
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This part considers reforms to trade secret law that would strengthen and
clarify consideration of a defendant’s unauthorized but socially beneficial
use of another’s trade secret. The creation of statutory safe harbors or
categorical exemptions from trade secret subject matter may carry certain
benefits in terms of predictability and consistency. But such reforms
require legislative action in the face of industry lobbying efforts, and a
piecemeal approach to the problem risks under-inclusion and incoherence.
Instead, I argue that trade secret law needs a more comprehensive and
standardized doctrine of fair use. This part sketches the contours of such a
doctrine, which will provide courts with defined factors to weigh, in order
to better balance exclusive rights and public welfare. This part also
addresses potential objections to this approach.
A. Enacting Statutory Safe Harbors
One possible reform is for federal or state legislatures to enact clearly
defined, nonexclusive fair use “safe harbors” for trade secret law. Uses that
fall within these categories would be considered per se fair use, rendering
users free from liability. A few scholars seem to support such specific
carve-outs. For example, Annemarie Bridy has argued that trade secret
protection for medical device pricing data should be precluded.275
Similarly, David Levine has suggested that trade secret protection should
not be available for “private entities engaged in activities such as providing
voting or breathalyzer machines to the government.”276
The benefits of such an approach compared to a flexible fair use doctrine
are greater certainty and predictability of application. To be sure, one of the
key criticisms of copyright fair use doctrine is courts’ inconsistent and
unpredictable application of the doctrine.277 But statutory fair use harbors
come with their own set of practical concerns. For example, they require
legislative enactment. And any legislative action at the state or federal level
restricting owners’ rights or reducing the breadth of trade secret subject
matter seems unlikely, given that industry lobbying has resulted in a oneway ratcheting up of intellectual property owners’ rights to exclude.278 By
contrast, a multifactor test need not be enacted by legislatures in the first
instance. Notably, copyright fair use arose from the common law over a
century before codification.279
275. Bridy, supra note 5, at 189.
276. Levine, supra note 220, at 435.
277. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 165.
278. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. In fact, Congress is currently
considering legislation to federalize trade secrecy, which would likely have the effect of
strengthening the rights of trade secret owners. These proposals include the Promoting
American Trade Secrets Act of 2012, S. 3389, 112th Cong. (2012), and the Defend Trade
Secrets Act of 2014, S. 2667, 113th Cong. (2014). For a discussion of these proposals and
their potential enhancement of trade secret owners’ rights (like broadening the scope of trade
secret misappropriation to cover extraterritorial conduct), see Seaman, supra note 28, at 25–
31, 59–63.
279. The judiciary introduced copyright’s fair use doctrine over 150 years before it was
codified by the legislature in the Copyright Act. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1210
(observing that “[h]istorically, courts in intellectual property cases have adjusted the law to
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Another drawback of a piecemeal safe harbor approach is a lack of
coherence—a criticism that has also been levied against statutory safe
harbors in copyright law.280 Finally, statutory safe harbors risk underinclusiveness, because certain beneficial uses cannot be foreseen. The
flexibility of a multifactor fair use analysis can accommodate unanticipated
but beneficial uses across a broad range of industries.281 On balance, a
trade secret fair use defense seems preferable—though supplementation by
specifically targeted fair use safe harbors (e.g., medical devices pricing
data) might also make sense, provided there is legislative will to do so.
B. Trade Secret Fair Use
As demonstrated in Parts II and III, trade secret law lacks a coherent
framework for dealing with cases of substantial improvement or disclosure
cases that trigger First Amendment interests. In the sections that follow, I
map out the contours of trade secret fair use.
While this proposed trade secret fair use analysis resembles copyright fair
use in certain respects, it diverges to address certain differences in trade
secret subject matter—e.g., technical inventions comprise a larger part of
trade secret subject matter. Significantly, a doctrine of trade secret fair use
should (more clearly than its copyright counterpart) bifurcate the questions
of whether infringement liability should be excused and whether
compensation is required. In this respect, the suggested trade secret fair use
inquiry borrows from the insights of patent remedies analysis post-eBay, as
well as from the insights of scholars advocating a fair use–type defense in
the patent context.282
In practical terms, courts should rely on defined factors to guide a trade
secret fair use analysis. Relevant factors include: (1) the purpose and
character of the use (e.g., whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes); (2) the nature of the trade secret
information (e.g., whether it is of a technical nature, like a manufacturing
process, or a business nature, like pricing data); (3) the substantiality of the
trade secret information used relative to the plaintiff’s end product/process
and the defendant’s end product/process (e.g., the extent to which the
defendant has “improved” upon the trade secret information); and (4) the
effect of the use on the owner’s incentives and likelihood of market harm.
The analysis under individual factors may overlap to a certain degree. And,
as in copyright, this list need not be exhaustive and no one factor need be

address changing conditions”); see also Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure
Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1,
13–22 (1997).
280. See, e.g., Fagundes, supra note 70, at 1835 (noting the “disconnected, granular
exemptions scattered” throughout the Copyright Act).
281. For example, when copyright fair use was codified in 1976, the legislature likely did
not foresee certain beneficial uses—e.g., use of copyrighted images in searchable digital
databases, like Google Books. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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determinative. Moreover, because trade secret fair use is an equitable and
affirmative defense, the infringer bears the burden of proof.
If the court decides that the infringement is fair under these factors, the
next question is whether the infringer should compensate the trade secret
owner. As a general matter, if a defendant’s use is deemed a substantial
improvement and thus fair under the factors above, the defendant should be
required to compensate the trade secret owner through a reasonable royalty.
On the other hand, if the defendant’s disclosure of a secret is for educational
purposes related to public health, safety, or welfare, then this is likely to
result in a royalty-free outcome—i.e., analogous to copyright’s “all-ornothing” fair use.
I address each of these factors in greater depth below, though a
comprehensive discussion of each factor is not possible in a single article.
Rather, the goal of the sections that follow is to set forth, in broad brush
strokes, the guiding principles of a trade secret fair use analysis.
1. Purpose of the Infringing Use
Pursuant to this factor, courts would assess the purpose of the infringing
use, including whether it is commercial or noncommercial. Similar to
copyright law, a noncommercial use would weigh in favor of fair use. For
example, under this factor, courts would look more favorably upon a
defendant who discloses information for nonprofit, educational purposes
(e.g., to educate the public about the hazards of a chemical composition)
than a market competitor using the information to create a similar end
product.283 A commercial use is more likely than a noncommercial use to
depress the originator’s incentives without a concomitant increase in social
welfare. While commercial uses are less likely to be fair use than
noncommercial ones, the fact that a use is commercial should not
automatically lead to a rejection of fair use.
2. The Nature of the Trade Secret Information
From the perspective of promoting incentives to create, businesses have
adequate incentives to create certain kinds of information, like customer
lists and pricing data. Trade secret law plays less of a role in incentivizing
the creation of this kind of “business” information than it does “technical”
information, like manufacturing processes and chemical formulas.284 Also,
the latter hew more closely to the historical origins of trade secret law.
Early trade secret cases largely involved secret manufacturing processes,
and attempts to expand protection to business information like customer
lists were viewed with skepticism.285
283. This factor echoes a suggestion of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
with respect to unauthorized disclosures of trade secrets. See supra note 209 and
accompanying text.
284. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
285. See Bridy, supra note 5, at 194–97 (noting that “in some of the early cases involving
customer lists, claims of trade secret protection for information not readily classifiable as a
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Interestingly, courts already make this distinction in the context of
discovery disputes during patent litigation for claims involving trade
secrets—i.e., affording greater protection to proprietary technical
information than to ordinary business information.286 Thus, in assessing
factor two, courts should look at whether the protected information is of a
technical nature (e.g., patentable process or chemical formula) or if it is of a
business nature (e.g., pricing data)—the latter weighing in favor of a
finding of fair use.
Similarly, the copyright fair use inquiry recognizes that some types of
protected works are closer to the core of what copyright law is meant to
protect. That is, creative works, like a novel or a musical composition, are
viewed as more deserving of protection than fact-based works, like a
history textbook or almanac.287
3. The Substantiality of the Trade Secret Information Used
Relative to the Plaintiff’s End Product/Process
and the Defendant’s End Product/Process
Under this factor, courts should primarily assess the extent to which the
defendant has improved upon the trade secret. Substantial improvement of
trade secret information will weigh in favor of fair use. The explicit
consideration of improvement attempts to adjust the exclusion right in a
way that encourages substantial follow-on improvements.
As previously discussed, both the definition and calculation of
improvement present unique challenges in the trade secret context.288 But
where, for example, the defendant claims that protected information was
used to create a more efficient or better functioning version of the original
technology, courts can assess the substantiality of the improvement by
considering evidence of its commercial success and measurable impact on
an industry, if such evidence is available.289 Similarly, the defendant’s use
of trade secret information as an intermediate step in producing a different
method, formula or process and not the product of any ‘special ingenuity’ were regarded
with skepticism by courts, which sought to distinguish trade secrets from ordinary, albeit
private, business information”); see also, e.g., Progress Laundry Co. v. Hamilton, 270 S.W.
834, 836–37 (Ky. App. 1925); In re Bolster, 110 P. 547, 548 (Wash. 1919) (“The term ‘trade
secret’ as it is usually understood means a secret formula or process, not patented, known
only to certain individuals who use it in compounding or manufacturing some article of trade
having a commercial value. It is rarely, if ever, used to denote the mere privacy with which
an ordinary commercial business is carried on.”).
286. See, e.g., Tailored Lighting, Inc. v. Osram Sylvania Prods., Inc., 236 F.R.D. 146, 148
(W.D.N.Y. 2006); Uniroyal Chem. Co. v. Syngenta Crop Prot., 224 F.R.D. 53, 57 (D. Conn.
2004); Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v. Sundstand Data Control, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 20, 22 (D.
Del. 1988).
287. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994); Feist
Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991).
288. See supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text.
289. Cf. Varadarajan, supra note 10, at 709–10 (suggesting that similar facts should guide
remedies determinations in the patent context). In patent law, the commercial success of an
invention is also viewed as a “secondary consideration” that influences the
“nonobviousness” inquiry. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
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end product than the plaintiff’s end product is more suggestive of
improvement. Moreover, a plaintiff’s non-use of the protected information
(which the UTSA problematically permits),290 compared to the defendant’s
productive use of the information is also more suggestive of improvement.
Requiring improvement to be of a “substantial” or “significant” degree is
an important limitation to address concerns of opportunism by competitors.
Under this framework, a trade secret defendant cannot escape liability by
making marginal or minor improvements. Moreover, given the difficulty of
identifying and valuing improvement in the intellectual property context, a
significance requirement can help manage courts’ definitional anxiety in
labeling a second-comer’s unauthorized use an improvement that merits
departure from the traditional trade secret analysis.291 In close cases, or
where the value of the defendant’s contribution is ambiguous, this factor
will favor the trade secret owner and a finding of fair use is unlikely.
4. Effect of the Use on Owner’s Incentives/Likelihood of Market Harm
Pursuant to this factor, courts can consider whether the infringer’s use (if
it became widespread) would have an adverse economic impact on the trade
secret owner and depress the owner’s innovation incentives. To some
extent, this factor overlaps with the previous factor, in that the defendant’s
use of the plaintiff’s trade secret to create a different, noncompeting end
product, or plaintiff’s non-use of the protected information, is less likely to
result in market harm to the plaintiff. However, if a work is deemed a
substantial or significant improvement under factor three, then the market
harm analysis should recede in importance. Thus, “courts must be willing
to permit a use in circumstances where it adds a great deal of value relative
to what has been copied, even if the result is to harm the market for the
original.”292
And as with copyright’s market harm analysis, the primary focus is
market usurpation by a directly competing product, not the harm that results
from negative commentary or criticism. So if a book critic writes a bad
review of a novel that incorporates quoted sections of the book without
permission, and this bad review results in fewer sales, that is not a form of
market harm that weighs against a finding of copyright fair use.293
Similarly, where trade secret protected information is disclosed for public
health purposes and results in market harm to the owner, that market harm
is not cognizable under this factor.
Moreover, with respect to the trade secret owner’s innovation incentives,
the nature of the trade secret information will once again play a part in the
analysis, as businesses often have adequate incentives to create “business”

290. See supra note 34.
291. Varadarajan, supra note 10, at 682–83 (describing the similar purpose of the
“significance” requirement in traditional property’s “improvement doctrines”).
292. Lemley, supra note 66, at 1078.
293. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591–93 (1994) (explaining
the distinction between “remediable displacement and unremediable disparagement”).
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information even in the absence of trade secret protection.294 As for
“technical” information that is more akin to patentable subject matter,
courts can also consider “the nature of both R&D and product market
competition in the particular industry.”295 If, for example, “the R&D
investment is quite large in absolute dollars,” there may be a greater effect
on innovation incentives because the owner “may require a certain lead
time in the market to allow it to recoup both its investment and a reasonable
return.”296
5. Appropriateness of a Reasonable Royalty
One of the criticisms of copyright fair use (and affirmative defenses in
intellectual property more generally) is the “all-or-nothing” nature of the
inquiry. If, for example, a use is deemed fair, users do not have to pay to
use the work. On the other hand, if the use is not subject to an affirmative
defense, then “users face the . . . full arsenal of remedies.”297 Compulsory
licenses stand between the two ends of the spectrum, allowing unauthorized
uses for pay. The patent remedies analysis post-eBay also helps mediate the
two extremes.
Courts can use the four-factor test described above to help with the
compensation inquiry. But as a general matter, should a defendant’s use be
deemed a substantial improvement and thus “fair” under the factors above,
the defendant would likely be required to compensate the trade secret owner
through a reasonable royalty. On the other hand, if the defendant’s
disclosure of a secret was for educational purposes related to public health,
safety, or welfare, then this is likely to result in a royalty-free outcome—
e.g., analogous to copyright’s “all-or-nothing” fair use.
The benefit of this approach is that it recognizes and attempts to reconcile
the somewhat discordant strains of fair use. On the one hand, fair use is
sometimes justified because of high transaction costs that frustrate private
bargaining. But copyright fair use also “excuses payment because the fair
use is of a type, like criticism or responding to it, that policymakers believe
should not be commodified” because it promotes First Amendment
interests.298 This concern applies equally to the many of the public interest
cases described in Part III—in such cases, a “free” fair use seems more
justified.
The difficulties of valuation (e.g., crafting a reasonable royalty) are an
oft-invoked reason for preferring injunctive relief, rather than damages, to
remedy intellectual property infringement.299 Valuation difficulties are,
however, largely unavoidable in the context of intellectual property. For
294. See supra notes 103, 284 and accompanying text.
295. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1208.
296. Id.
297. Fagundes, supra note 70, at 1840.
298. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1209 (noting that “educational and other non-profit uses
like pure research often fall into this category”).
299. See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2659–60 (1994).
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example, they suffuse licensing negotiations, settlements, and damage
awards for past infringement. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in eBay
underscores this point, by insisting that courts cannot avoid the difficulties
of valuation by automatically resorting to injunctive relief in patent
infringement cases.300
C. Addressing Objections to Trade Secret Fair Use
Lack of predictability is one of the biggest criticisms of fair use in the
copyright context.301 Parchomovsky and Goldman, for example, argue that
the preference for ambiguous “standards” like fair use over clearer rules can
“lead to overdeterrence, which, in turn, will cause potential defendants to
overinvest in precautions.”302 The unpredictability inherent in a flexible,
context-specific fair use defense, along with increased opportunism
concerns, may indeed lead trade secret owners to invest in wasteful
expenditures to protect secrecy (e.g., stronger walls and fences) that trade
secret law was intended to alleviate.303 Moreover, increased concerns of
opportunism may also have a deleterious effect on owners’ innovation
incentives—particularly with respect to information or know-how that does
not fall within patentable subject matter (e.g., negative know-how).
While these are legitimate concerns, the introduction of a fair use defense
might nonetheless have a positive channeling effect—i.e., encouraging
innovators to protect patentable technical information with a patent rather
than trade secret, thus giving the public the benefit of full disclosure.304 In
recent years, certain legal developments have made trade secret protection
“more attractive vis-à-vis patent protection.”305 These developments
include the expansion of prior user rights in the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act306 (AIA), new limits on patentable subject matter,307 and the

300. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).
301. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 165, at 1485–89 (suggesting
nonexclusive safe harbors as a supplement (or alternative) to fair use in copyright).
302. Id. at 1486; see also John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty
on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 995 (1984).
303. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
304. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (patent disclosure requirements); see also Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 494 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) (observing that
“trade secret protection provides in some instances a substantial disincentive to entrance into
the patent system,” which “deprives society of the benefits of public disclosure of the
invention which it is the policy of the patent laws to encourage”).
305. Seaman, supra note 28, at 62.
306. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). The AIA created a defense to
infringement based on prior commercial use for entities that commercially used a claimed
invention “at least 1 year before . . . the effective filing date of the claimed invention . . . or
the date on which the claimed invention was disclosed to the public.” 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(2).
This defense applies to information that was used to create a commercial product, so a trade
secret owner who opted for trade secret protection in lieu of a patent has a handy defense
should the same invention be patented by a subsequent inventor. See Seaman, supra note 28,
at 59–60.
307. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1304–05 (2012).
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elimination of the “general rule” of issuing injunctive relief upon a finding
of patent infringement.308
Moreover, while uncertainty is often a feature of legal “standards” like
fair use as opposed to more rigid “rules,” requiring the consideration of prefixed factors can help mitigate uncertainty.309 And the dangers of systemic
uncertainty may lessen over time, once parties “become aware of the
paradigmatic cases in which it will likely be successful.”310 The
introduction of uncertainty may also help facilitate trade secret licensing.311
CONCLUSION
Intellectual property law seeks to optimize social welfare by guarding
against both the under- and over-protection of information. To this end,
owners’ rights to exclude are limited when unauthorized uses carry certain
social benefits. Copyright law and (to a lesser extent) patent law
incorporate ex post limiting doctrines that try to balance owners’ rights to
exclude against competing concerns, such as promoting cumulative
innovation and First Amendment interests. Notably, copyright law’s fair
use doctrine protects a variety of unauthorized but socially beneficial uses,
like educational and “transformative” uses. While patent law relies more on
ex ante requirements for this balancing purpose, it too has ex post limiting
doctrines—like the reverse doctrine of equivalents and an increasingly
searching remedies analysis—that direct courts to consider the social
benefits of a defendant’s unauthorized use.
Like unauthorized users in patent and copyright, certain transgressors of
trade secret law (e.g., substantial “improvers” of protected information and
“disclosers” of information related to public health, safety and welfare) also
serve socially beneficial ends. This Article demonstrates, however, that
trade secret law is largely indifferent to them. This is particularly
concerning, given trade secret law’s expansive subject matter breadth, ease
of acquisition, and increasing attractiveness to companies. While the
theoretical justifications for trade secret law historically have been more
varied and controversial than for patent or copyright, courts and scholars
increasingly theorize trade secret law as a subset of intellectual property
because it encourages information production. Despite its characterization
as “intellectual property,” however, trade secret law lacks adequate ex post
308. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
309. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1247–48; see also Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 569 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 963–64 (1995) (describing legal “devices” that
operate as intermediaries between rules and standards, like factors).
310. O’Rourke, supra note 16, at 1247–48.
311. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1039–47 (1995) (suggesting
liability rules can induce parties to reveal information they might otherwise keep to
themselves in the shadow of a property rule because a liability rule makes the outcome more
uncertain for both parties); Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power
Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and NonInjunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 988 (1999).
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limiting doctrines designed to promote cumulative innovation and First
Amendment interests.
This Article argues that trade secret law should adopt a multifactor fair
use doctrine to better accommodate these competing concerns. This
defense would require courts to weigh four defined factors in deciding
whether to excuse a defendant’s otherwise infringing acts, or alternatively,
deny injunctive relief in favor of a reasonable royalty. These factors are
designed to help courts identify situations where substantial improvements
or public disclosure of matters relevant to public health, safety, and welfare
are likely to be deterred. Though named after its copyright counterpart,
trade secret fair use will differ in some key respects. Unlike copyright’s
“all-or-nothing” fair use analysis, the trade secret fair use analysis will
require courts to decide whether a reasonable royalty award is warranted
(e.g., in cases of substantial improvement). In this way, trade secret law can
continue to protect owners’ incentives, while nonetheless ensuring safety
valves for cumulative innovation and First Amendment interests that will
help keep the law in sync with its intellectual property siblings.

